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ABSTRACT Y cA s^s i0l 00L
This study analyzed the first price sealed bid auction (FPSBA) using computer
simulations. The first price sealed bid auction is a static Bayesian game with incomplete
information. These games have a well-defined symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium. The
existence of the equilibrium makes it possible to find the bidders' equilibrium strategies.
The equilibrium strategy maximizes the bidders' profit. This thesis assumes, (1) the
bidders act rationally and have private information about their production cost, (2) the
bidders' preferences and information are symmetric, (3) the buyer committed not to
deviate from the auction rules, even if a deviation would be profitable. Considering these
assumptions and the equilibrium strategy, this Thesis constructed a FPSBA model. The
model was transformed into an algorithm and coded in Visual Basic language. The code
was used to simulate the FPSBA in different scenarios. The simulation showed the
bidders' behavior and identified factors affecting the bidders' decision during bid
preparation. Critical factors include the cost distribution and number of bidders. The
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Hungary assumes that establishing a stable security environment on the European
Continent is in her vital interest. The transformation to a stable democracy in Central and
Eastern Europe has contributed to the security of the region and Europe as a whole. At
the same time, the social tensions within the transforming countries, ethnic and religious
diversities rooted in history, require the permanent development of a new security
architecture.
Hungary's strategic goal is to gain full membership in the existing international
security and defense organizations, including the Western European Union and NATO.
The country's geostrategic position, fundamentals, material and human resources justify
maintaining armed forces with self-defense capabilities comparable to similar Central and
Eastern European countries. However, Hungary deems her armed forces to be the very
last means of self-defense.
The Republic of Hungary has made a commitment to join the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) in the near future, and to transform her armed forces into a
modern force capable of meeting the NATO's military standards.
In due course we are preparing ourselves for participating in missions deriving
from NATO basic principles, such as the common defense pronounced in Article 5 of
the Washington Treaty, furthermore to contribute to peacekeeping operations,
humanitarian and other new missions. Regarding the modernization of the Hungarian
Defense Forces (HDF), we intend to harmonize ourselves with the major polices and
priorities indicated in the NATO Enlargement Study. [Ref. 1]
Modernization of the Hungarian Defense Forces (HDF) has already started. The
winner of the low-level air-defense system tender was announced in February 1997. A new
request for proposal will be solicited for modernizing the air surveillance systems in the
near future. Hungary is considering rejuvenating her Air Force and other outdated military
hardware as well. These initiatives require new practices of procurement source selection
that use the country's scarce resources more efficiently.
The Public Procurement Law of Hungary, enacted in 1995, defines the
requirement for public acquisition of goods and services in Hungary. The Public
Procurement Law obligates the public fund users to select suppliers on a competitive
bases. The Law outlines the methods of public procurement and it states that 'all
contracts exceeding value of HUF 5,000,000 [Apr. $35,000] should be awarded to the
winner of a publicly announced tender." [Ref. 2] The winner is the best bid when all other
conditions are equal.
Market conditions in Hungary are changing day after day. New potential sources
for military procurement come into sight and disappear. The international market, where
the HDF expects to acquire its military equipment, differs geographically and economically
as well. It includes all the major defense industry players in NATO and non-NATO
countries. As the economic conditions are diverse, so various are the offers coming from
the bidders. A fair and efficient method of bid selection can increase efficiency in using the
HDF scarce resources.
Auctions are one of the market institutions that provide a competitive environment
for public procurement. Auctioning practice and theory classify auctions in two major
groups; first and second price auctions. In a first-price auction, the bidders submit their
bids simultaneously and the lowest bidder wins the auction at the bid price. Rules of
second-price sealed bid auctions stipulate that the bidder submitting the lowest (highest)
bid win the auction and pay the second lowest (highest) price. [Ref. 3] The first-price
sealed bid auction is one of the basic tools for source selection in the Government
procurement and in the HDF in particular. While the second-price sealed bid auction has
useful theoretical properties, it is rarely used in practice and it has never been used in
Hungary.
To understand the strategic behavior of the bidders and to find opportunities to
influence the recent auctioning practice in the HDF, this thesis proposes a model of the
FPSBA. The model describes the strategic behavior of the bidders and their actions in
conditions similar to the actual bidding conditions, based on findings ofGame Theory.
A. AN OVERVIEW OF THE HDF PROCUREMENT ACTIVITY
The HDF has a composite procurement system. It consists of two major
subsystems; they are the unit-level, decentralized procurement subsystem and the
centralized acquisition subsystem. The decentralized subsystem buys goods and services
from the local market (food for the soldiers, building maintenance service for barracks
buildings and similar activities). The volume of local procurement is significant and it is
approximately 15 - 20 % of HDF's over all maintenance costs. The centralized
procurement system acquires goods and services for the HDF, to keep up the combat
readiness of the troops and to provide planed development of military hardware.
To comply with the Public Procurement Law ofHungary, the military procurement
system uses competitive acquisition from abroad and from the domestic market. As the
market economy advances in Hungary, more domestic potential suppliers come into view
for the HDF. However, in some areas of military procurement, sole source acquisition
remains the practice. The complexity of market conditions and the diverse assortment of
the goods and services under procurement require proper acquisition practices from the
HDF. Understanding the behavioral patterns of the potential supplier, their motivations
and strategic behavior better prepares the buyer. The more prepared the buyers, the better
are their chance of concluding effective and efficient business deals.
The HDF and the acquisition organization of the Hungary's Ministry of Defense
use a wide variety of competitive procurement policies and practices. Sealed bid auctions
have been extensive applied recently by the HDF. They have been used in purchasing
major defense equipment, low unit cost but high volume materials, and various services as
well. The Hungarian acquisition system generally uses first price sealed bid auctions. In
some areas of procurement, however, open bidding practices are also used. The
developing acquisition policy is considering new forms and activities.
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND RESEARCH METHODS
The primary research question for this thesis is as follows:
How do profit maximizing suppliers choose their bids in a competitive environment?
This thesis research examines the following secondary research questions:
1. Does the FPSBA have a game equilibrium, and if it has, what are the
equilibrium strategies of the bidders?
2. Do the bidders have a dominant strategy in First Price Sealed Bid Auctions?
3. How does the change in bidders' numbers affect the outcome of the FPSBA?
4. How does the cost distribution affect the outcome ofthe FPSBA?
5. How can HDF use the findings of this Thesis in their acquisition practice?
C. SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH AND ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
This thesis is limited to applying the FPSBA to those areas where the HDF has a
limited number of responsive and responsible potential suppliers. The limitation also
applies to the goods and services the HDF intends to acquire. The goods and services
should be accurately specified and the HDF or the Acquisition Office must not deviate
from these specifications.
On the bases of conducted research, this thesis:
1
.
Will review the contracting practice of the HDF to find those areas where the
bidding for contract simulations can take place,
2. Will review the theory of auctioning activity and the game theory providing the
background for constructing a model of the FPSBA,
3. Will develop a computer simulation to analyze the FPSBA and experiment with
the model.
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4. Will provide recommendations to use computer simulations of FPSBA
auctions in the HDF's contracting practice.
The thesis has been organized in four chapters as follows. Chapter II surveys the
development of auctioning theory. Considering competitive selling auctions, the chapter
defines the bidding for contract game in normal-form, and the existence of a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium in these games. The Chapter develops bidding functions for two and
three bidders in the bidding for contract game. The bidding function is developed when the
bidders' production costs are distributed uniformly, and for the case where the cost
distribution follows a triangular distribution.
Chapter III describes the experiments conducted with the constructed model.
Computer simulation has been used as the basic experimentation tool. The chapter gives a
summary of the settings and methodology in which the experiments were organized; the
chapter also analyzes the results.
Conclusions and recommendations are provided in Chapter IV. This chapter
addresses each of the primary and secondary research questions posed in this chapter, and
provides concluding remarks about the feasibility of HDF using computer simulations in
acquisition practice. Additionally, it suggests areas for further research.
D. DEFINITIONS
Auction ~ as used throughout this thesis, refers to 'a market institution with an
explicit set of rules determining resource allocation and price on the basis of bidding from
the market participants. "[Ref. 4]
Strategy — as used throughout this thesis, refers to the definition, given by
von Neuman and Morgenstern, founders of the Game Theory 'a complete plan: a plan that
specifies what choices [the player] will make in every possible situation "[Ref. 5]
Bidder — as the name implies, refers to a responsive and responsible prospective
supplier, where:
1. A responsive supplier implies the offeror has the ability to comply with the
specifications, quantities to be delivered, and terms and conditions encountered
in the contract,
2. responsive supplier:
a) has adequate financial resources to perform the contract or the ability to
obtain such resources
b) is able to comply with the contracted delivery schedule,
c) has the necessary organization, experience, and technical skills.
d) has the necessary production, construction or technical equipment and
facility to perform the contract obligations, [Ref. 5]
Buyer — as the name implies, refers to a government agency (the HDF in
particular) soliciting a request for proposal to submit a bid for a specified contract.
Bidding for contract game ~ as used throughout this thesis, refers to the
definition of a single stage static game with incomplete information played by the bidders.
The buyer is not actively involved in the game.
H. BACKGROUND
This Chapter will explore the basis of auctioning theory. The first part of the
Chapter will analyze the games to which auctioning activity applies. The bounding of the
game to a class limits the scope of the research. The second part of the Chapter will
analyze bidding for contract games. The third part of this Chapter will summarize the
basics of the order statistics, which will later be used to control the simulation outcome.
After identifying the main characteristics of the static non-cooperative games of imperfect
information, this Chapter will conclude with the normal-form representation and the
equilibrium strategies ofthe bidding for contract games.
Organized auctioning from which sealed bidding originates dates back to the
ancient times. One of the earliest reports of an auction was given by Herodotus. He
described the sale ofwomen to be wives in Babylon around the fifth century BC. In China,
as early as the seventh century AD, the personal belongings of deceased Buddhist monks
were sold at auction.
1
In modern times, auctioning practice distinguishes two major families of auctions.
The first is selling auctions held to market goods and to sell them at the highest possible
price. In other class of auctions, the buyer purchases goods or services from competing
suppliers, represented by bidders. This thesis will call the later group 'bidding for
contract" auctions. Using this terminology, we can distinguish the two types of actions.
Game theory links these two auction types to the same class of games, called static non-
cooperative games with imperfect and incomplete information.
A. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES OF THE FPSBA
William Vickrey laid the foundation for auction theory in his remarkable 1961
paper. [Ref. 3] Paul Milgrom and Robert Weber provided a general framework to analyze
the competitive bidding process. [Ref. 8] McAfee and MacMillan gave a comprehensive
1
These and other historical references can be found in Cassady [Ref. 7]
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survey of auction theory in 1987.[Ref. 4] Several other authors have explored auctioning,
mostly concentrating on the selling auctions. Charles Holt [Ref. 9] and William Samuelson
[Ref. 10] developed the theory of competitive bidding for contracts. The literature
describes four basic types of auction: the English auction (also called oral open or
ascending auction); the Dutch auction (also called oral open descending auction); the first-
price sealed-bid auction; and the second-price sealed-bid (or Vickrey) auction.
The English auction is the most frequently used form for selling goods. The
English auction prescribes that the price of the goods up for auctions is successively raised
until only one bidder remains. The rising price can be announced by an auctioneer or the
bidders themselves, or by having the bids submitted electronically with the current highest
price posted.
The Dutch auction is the reverse of the English auction. The auctioneer calls an
initial price, high enough to be above the bid of any of the participants. Then the price is
lowered until one bidder accepts the current price. From game theory point of view, the
distinguishing feature of the English and Dutch auctions is that, the bidders always know
the actual level of the highest bid. Both auctions are oral auctions. Although, these auction
forms have their merits, they are not usually used in government contracting.
In a first price sealed bid auction, the potential sellers (buyers) submit sealed bids
simultaneously, and the lowest (highest) bidder is awarded the contract for the price bid.
With the sealed bid auction, each bidder has only one opportunity to bid. The difference
between the first-price sealed bid auction and the English auction is that the bidders at the
sealed bid auction cannot observe the rival's bids; they cannot revise and alter their bids
correspondingly.
In the second price sealed bid auction, the bidder submitting the lowest (highest)
bid wins the auction, but the winner will get (will pay) the second lowest (highest) price.
[Ref. 4] First-price sealed bid auctions are one of the basic tools for source selection in
Government procurement, and in the HDF. The second-price sealed bid auction has useful
theoretical properties but is rarely used in practice.
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Combinations of these basic auctioning forms have been used quite often, and
additional rules are often imposed along with the basic auction rules. For example, a
reservation price can be imposed, discarding all the bids if they are lower (higher) then the
reservation price. The auctioneer may charge bidders an entry fee for the right to
participate in the auction or the auctioneer may impose certain preferences on some of the
bidders. An example of the late provision is a 10% price advantages for domestic bidders
over the foreign bidders as stipulated by the Public Procurement Law ofHungry. [Ref 2]
B. THEORY OF SEALED BID AUCTION GAMES
This section will define the representation of the bidding for contract game, after
studying non-cooperative games with incomplete information. Defining the equilibrium in
non-cooperative games with incomplete information will provide the theoretical basis to
determine the bidders' equilibrium strategies. The appearance of the equilibrium in the
game will facilitate surveying the bidders' strategies in FPSBA.
1. Normal-Form Representation Of Non-Cooperative Games with
Incomplete Information
This thesis surveys non-cooperative games of incomplete information based on the
study of R. Gibson [Ref. 12]. To develop a normal form representation of the static game
with incomplete information, also called Bayesian games, we have to consider non-
cooperative games of complete information. We can represent the normal form of an n
player game with complete information, as follows:
G= { Si,..., S„;ui,...,u„}
where: S; — player i's strategic space
Ui ~ player i's payoff function
when the player selects strategy (si, s2,. . ., s„)
Further assuming that the players move simultaneously, than the non-cooperative
game of complete information for a player simply involves choosing an action from the
rationally available action space, A.
So, we can rewrite the normal-form of the game of complete information:
G= { Ai,..., A„, Ui,...,Un }
where: Ai ~ player i's action space
u; ~ player i's payoff function
In the static non-cooperative game of complete information, the timing of moves is
as follows: the players simultaneously choose an action from the feasible set of actions
A; (i.e. player i chooses action ai), and the payoff of Ui (ai, a2, . . ,a„) is received.
The first step in developing the normal-form representation of the non-
cooperative game with incomplete information is denoting the idea that each player has
private information about his or her payoff. The players, however, are uncertain about
other players' payoff functions. Let player i's possible payoff function be represented as Ui
(ai, &2, ••-, a„, tj), where ti is called the player i's type, ti belongs to a set of possible types
(type space). Each ti type corresponds to a different payoff function. J. Harsanyi
[Ref. 12] first applied this notion for representing the payoff functions in games of
incomplete information.
Given this definition of players' types, if players know their payoff functions it is
equivalent to players knowing their type. Likewise, saying that player i may be uncertain
about the other players' payoff function is equivalent to stating that player i is uncertain
about the other players' type, denoted ti(ti, ...,ti-i, ti+i,...,tn). T. ; represents the set of all
possible values oft.;.
Players have beliefs about the other players' types. We denote the probability
distribution of player i's belief about the probability distribution of other players' type,
given that player i is type ti, as pi(tjti). In our analysis the players' types (cost) are
identical and independent. In this case, pi(t.; I ti) does not depend on ti, thus we can write
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player i's belief as pj(t-i). There are contexts in which the other players' types are
correlated; for simplicity we assume independence of the types.
We can derive the normal form representation of the non-cooperative game with
incomplete information by joining the normal form representation of the non-cooperative
game with complete information and the concepts of type and distribution of beliefs.
Definition [Ref 12:pg. 148] the normal-form representation of an n-player non-
cooperative game with incomplete information specifies the players' action space
Ai, ... ,An, their type space Ti, ... ,Tn , their beliefs pi, ...,pn, and their payoff functions
ui, ... ,un . Player i's type, privately known by player i, determines player i's payoff
function u; (ai, a2, ... an, ti), and is a member of the set of possible types T.i. Player i's belief
Pi(tilti) describes the uncertainty about the n-1 other players' possible types U given i's
type ti. We denote this game:
G={Ai,...,A„;Ti,...,Tn ;pi, ... p„ ; Ui, ... ,un}




nature draws a type vector tj = (ti, . .
.
, t„), where tj is drawn from the set of
possible types T;;
2. nature reveals ti to player i but not to any other player;
3. the players simultaneously choose actions; and player i chooses action ai from
the feasible set A*;
4. payoff Ui (ai, a2, ... a„, ti) is received.
Introducing the fictional move by nature, in steps 1 and 2, produces a game with
incomplete information that also satisfies the requirement for the games with imperfect
information. Because nature only reveals player i's type to player i, but not to other
players, the other players do not know the complete history of the game when taking their
actions. This is a condition of the game with imperfect information.
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Two technical assumptions complete our discussion about the normal-form
representation of an n-player non-cooperative game with incomplete information. First,
player i has private information about his type and also about the type of some other
player(s). We cannot exclude this condition from the bidding for contract game explicitly.
However, we can assume that the signal received about the other bidders' types is false,
and that bidders do not consider this information in selecting their action.
The second technical point involves beliefs about the other players, pi(tjlti). It is
assumed the timing of the game is common knowledge, so is the prior distribution p(t)
from which nature draws the type vector t = (ti, . .
.
, tn). When nature reveals t; to player i,
i can compute the belief Pi(t.j I ti) using Bayes' rule of conditional probability:
2
Pi(t-i I ti) = p(t.i, ti)/ p(t-i) = p(t.i, ti) / 1 p(t.i, tj)
Furthermore, a player can compute the beliefs that the other players might hold.
We assume that the type distribution is common knowledge in the bidding for contract
game and takes the form of either a uniform or triangular probability distribution.
2. Definition of Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
To define the equilibrium in the static Bayesian game, we have to first define the
strategic space of players. The players' strategy is a complete plan of action, specifying a
worthwhile action in every circumstance in which the player might be engaged. In a static
game with incomplete information, nature begins the game by drawing the players' type.
Thus, a strategy for player i must specify a feasible action for each of players i's possible
type.
2
Bayes' rule provides a formula for the conditional probability P( Al B) that event A will occur given that event B
has occurred [Ref. 1 3]
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Definition [Ref. 12: pg. 150] In the static Bayesian game G = { Ai, ... , A„ ; Ti,
. . .
,
Tn ; pi, . . . , pn ; ui, . . . , u„} a strategy for player i is a function Si(t;), where for each
type ti in T;, Si(ti) specifies the action from the feasible set A; that i would choose if type ti
is drawn by nature.
In static Bayesian games, unlike games with complete information, the strategic
space is not given in the normal-form representation of the game. In the games of
incomplete information, the strategic space is constructed from the type and action space.
Player i's set of possible strategies is the set of all possible functions with range Ai and
domain TV
It is seemingly unnecessary for the player i to specify actions for each of players i's
possible type. Once nature has revealed a specific type to the player, that player should not
be concern about the other possible types. However, in choosing a strategy, player i has to
consider what the other player will do. What the other players will do largely depends on
what they think player i will do if nature draws type ti from Tj. Therefore, player i should
consider what to do if each of the other players' types is drawn from the type space Tj
once a specific type is revealed to player i.
The central idea of the Bayesian Nash game equilibrium is that each player's
strategy must simultaneously be a best response to other players' strategy. This means that
no player wants to change his or her strategy, even if the change involves only one action
by one type.
Definition [Ref. 12:pg. 151] In the static Bayesian game G = (Ai, ... , A„ ; Ti, ...
,
Tn ; pi, ... , pn ; ui, ... , un } the strategies s* = (si*, .... s„*) are a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium for each player i and for each type t; in Ti, if Si(ti) solves
max £ Ui(si*(ti), . . . Si-i*(ti-i), a; , Si+i*(ti+ i), . . . , Sn*(tn) ; t)pi( t.i | ti)
It is straight forward to say that in the static Bayesian game with n players, if both
the possible action space (Ai, . . . , A„) and type space (Ti, . . . , Tn) are finite, there exists a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
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3. Normal-form Representation of Bidding for Contract Game
The FPSBA, from game theoretic point of view is a non-cooperative game with
incomplete information. These games are often called Bayesian games. In these games, at
least one of the players' payoff function is uncertain. In the bidding for contract game, the
player type is the expected cost; different expected costs for the bidder will provide
different payoffs. In FPSBA, each bidder knows their cost (valuation of the object on sale)
but does not know any other bidders' cost (valuation). Bids are submitted in sealed
envelopes, so we can assume that the bidders act simultaneously.
The normal-form representation of the bidding for contract game with two bidders
competing for the contract is represented as:
fbi-Ci, if bi<bj
i(bi, bj, q, Cj) = { l/2(bi-c0 if bi = bj
I f bi>bj
When more than two players are competing for a contract the normal-form
representation of the bidding for contract game is represented as:
fbj-Ci, if bi = min(bl,...,bn )
Ui(bi,...,bn, Ci,...,c„)=H l/p(bi-Ci) if bi = bj
I if bi>min(bl,...,bn)
i=l,2,...,n-l
Assuming no more than p bidders submit the same bid.
C. ORDER STATISTICS: AN OVERVIEW
This Section will survey the relevant order statistics theory using the guidelines
provided in R. Hogg and A. Craig classic book of mathematical statistics [Ref. 13].
Theory of order statistics deals with the ranked values of a sample of random variables
having drawn from a probability distribution. The ranking of the order statistics goes from
the smallest to largest. Order statistics have some remarkable characteristic.
14
For example: properties of the order statistics do not depend upon the distribution from
which the random sample has been drawn.
This thesis uses order statistics to analyze the outcome of the auctioning
simulations. Bids and the bidders' production costs can be considered to be random
variables drawn from a probability distribution. Ranking the submitted bids and the
expected costs in ascending order we generates typical order statistics.
Let Xi, X2 , X3 , ..., X„ denote a random sample from a continuos distribution,
having probability density function of f(x) that is positive over the interval of
a < x <b. Let Yi be the smallest of these Xj , Y2 be the second smallest, . . . , and Y„ be the
largest. That is Yi < Y2 < Y3 , . . ., Yn represents Xi, X2 , X3 , . . ., Xn when they are arranged
in ascending order. It can be proven that the joint probability distribution of
Yi<Y2 <Y3 , ...,Yn is given by
g(yi, y2 , y3 , ..., yn) = n!*[f(Xl)* f(x2)* f(x3)*,..., f(xn)]
ifa<yi <y2 <y3 , ...,yn <b
= elsewhere
The proof of this theorem is found in R. Hogg and A. Craig. [Ref. 13] The
marginal probability density function represents the probability density function of one of
the order statistics. This is given by
gk(yk) = n!/(n - k)! *[ F^f^l-FCyO]"* * f(yk) for a < yk < b
= elsewhere
The joint probability distribution function of the 1st and 2nd order statistics we can
be used to calculate the expected differences between the sample members. Chapter III
uses the computed results to control the simulation's outcomes. Examples of the
calculations are given in Appendix B.
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D. BIDDING FUNCTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COST DISTRIBUTION
A continuos random variable X has a uniform distribution if its probability density
function is given by:
f(x)= l/(h-l) Kx<h
= elsewhere
The cumulative distribution function of the uniform distribution is given by:
[ x < 1
F(x) = \ (x - l)/(h - 1) 1< x < h
I 1 x >h
Where: 1 < h and
1 - the lower limit of the distribution
h - the upper limit of the distribution
1. Bidding for Contract Games with Two Bidders
Assume that two bidders are competing for a contract and the bidders' production
cost C; has a uniform distribution over the range [0, 1]. Suppose Player j adopts the
strategy b() and assume that b(-) is strictly increasing and differentiable. For a given value
of Ci, player i's optimal bidding strategy solves
max (bi - ci)* Prob{ bi < b(cj)}
Let b
_1
(bj) denote the cost the bidder must have to bid bj. That is b
_1
(bj) = Cj if
bj = b(Cj). Since Cj is uniformly distributed on [0, 1], Prob{ bj < b(Cj)} = Prob {b" 1 (bi) < Cj}
= 1 - b"
1
(bi). The first order condition for player i's optimization problem is therefor:
d[(b; - crO-b'^bO^/dbi =0
Computing the derivative yields:
(1 - b-
1
(b,)) + (bi - cO*[d (1 - b" 1 (bi)) / dbi] =
The first order condition is an implicit equation for bidder i's best response to the
strategy b(-) played by bidder j, given that the i's bidder cost is Cj. If the strategy b(-) is to
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be a symmetric Nash equilibrium, we require that the solution of the first order condition
be b(cj). That is, for each of bidder i's costs, the bidder does not want to deviate from the
strategy b(-), given that bidder j plays this strategy.
To impose this requirement, we substitute bi = b(cj) into the first order condition,
yielding:
[1 - b'^bCci))] + (b(ci) - c;)*d [(1 - b'
1
(b(ci))]/dbi =
where: b^Kci)) = c, and d[l - b_1 (b(ci))]/dbi = - 1/ b'(ci)
Thus, b(-) must satisfy the first order differential equation
1 - cj - (b(ci) - cj)* l/b'(ci) =
1 - c; = (b(ci) - cO* l/b'(cO
b'(ci)*(l-c1)-b(ci) = -ci
The left hand side of the equation can be rewritten as:
b'(c,)*(l - c,) - b(ci) = d[(b(Ci)*( 1 - Ci)]/dci
Integrating both sides of the equation yields:
Jd[(b(c1)*(l-c 1)]/dci =-Jci dc1
b(ci)*(l-c1) = -cI2 /2 + k
To define k
,
we have to use the boundary conditions. These are b(ci) >= Ci
particularly, if c
;
= 1, b(l) must be finite, and it is. Thus k = Ci
2
/2 and k = 1/2 .
Substituting the value of k into the equation after integration we find the bidding
function for i.
b(Ci)*(l - cO = (1 - c,
2
) 12 b(cO = (1 + Ci)/2
In the same way, we can define the reaction function for j. It will take the form:
b(Cj) = (l + Cj)/2
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Under the assumption that the players' strategies are strictly increasing and
differentiable, we have a linear and symmetric Nash equilibrium in the two players bidding
game.
3
2. Bidding For Contract Games With Three Bidders
Assume that three bidders are competing for a contract and the bidders'
production cost C; has a uniform distribution over the range of [0, 1]. Suppose Player j and
k adopt the strategy b(-) and assume that b(-) is strictly increasing and differentiable. For a
given value of Ci, i's optimal bidding strategy solves:
max(bi - q)* Prob{b ; < b(cj) , bi < b(ck)}
Let b"
1
(bj) denote the cost the bidder must have in order to bid bj and b'
1
(bk)
denote the cost bidder must have to bid bk. That is b'^bj) = q if bj = b(Cj) and b'^bk) = Ck
ifbk = b(ck).
Since Cj and ck is uniformly distributed on [0, 1], Prob(bi < b(Cj)) =
= ProbCb"
1
(bi) < Cj) = 1 - b
_1
(bj) and Prob(bi < b(ck)) = ProbCb"
1
(bi) < ck) = 1 - b
1
(bi).
Therefor Prob(b, < b(cj) , bj < b(ck)) = (1 - b"
1
(bi))* (1 - b"
1





The first order condition for player i's optimization problem is given by:










+ (b, - c
;
)*2*((l - b' 1 (bi))*d[(l - b" 1 (bi)]/dbi =
Implying the same assumption as in case of two bidders, we substitute bi = b(cj)
into the first order condition, yielding:
[1 - b^Kci))] 2 + (b(ci) - c,)* 2*[1 - b- 1(b(ci))]*d[l - b" 1 (b(ci))]/dbi =
where: b'^ci)) = cj and d[l - b' 1 (b(ci))]/db £ = - l/b'(ci)
3 A Nash equilibrium is called symmetric if the players' strategy are identical. That is, in a symmetric Nash
equilibrium, there is a singe function b (c) such that bidder 1 's strategy bi(ci) is b(ci) and bidder 2's strategy b2(c2)
is b(C2), this singe strategy is the best response to itself. Of course, since bidders' costs will be different, their bid
will be different even if both use the same strategy. [Ref 12]
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Thus, the b(-) must satisfy the following first order differential equation:
(1 - Ci)
2
- (b(ci) - c;)*2* (1 - Ci)*l/b'(Ci) =
We can express this equation more conveniently as:
(1 - Ci)
2
= (b(ci) - Ci)*2* (1 - Ci)*l/ b'(ci)
b'(Ci)*(l-Ci) 2 -2b(ci) =-2ci
The left hand side of this equation can be rewritten as:
b'(ci)*( 1 - c,)
2
- 2 b(ci) =1/(1- cO* d[(b(Ci)*(l - c02]/dci
Integrating both sides of the equation, the right hand side by part
d[(b(Ci)*(l - Ci)
2
]/dCi= Ci*[- 2 *(1 - cO]








= Ci*(l - cO
2
+ [(1 - c0
3
]/3 + k
To eliminate k, we have to use the boundary conditions. That is, b(Ci) >= Cj; and
particularly if Ci = 1, b(l) must be finite , and it is. So, k =
Substituting value of k into the above equation, we find the bidding function for i.
b(Ci) = Ci + (l-Ci)/3 = [l+2*Ci]/3
b(cj) = (1 + 2cj)/3 and b(ck) = (1 + 2ck)/3 respectively.
Under the assumption that the players' strategies are strictly increasing and
differentiable, we derived a linear and symmetric Nash equilibrium in the three person
bidding game.
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E. BIDDING FUNCTIONS UNDER THE TRIANGULAR COST
DISTRD3UTION
In general, a random variable X has a triangular distribution if its probability
density function f(x) is given by
f 2*(x - l)/(h - l)*(m - 1)





Height = 2/(h - 1)
Figure 1 PDF of the triangular distribution
The cumulative distribution function F(x) of the triangular distribution is given by
f x <1
I
(x - l)2/(h - l)*(m - 1) 1 < x < m
F(x) = \ 1 - (h - x)
2
/ (h - l)*(h - m) m < x < h
I 1 x>h
Where: 1 < m < h and
1 - the lower limit of the distribution
h- the upper limit of the distribution
m - the mode of the distribution.
1. Bidding for Contract Games with Two Bidders
Assume that two bidders are competing for a contract and the bidders' production
cost Ci has a triangular distribution over the range [0, 2] with mode value [1].
The assumed production cost has a triangular distribution with probability density




f(c) = \ 2- c 1< c < 2
1 elsewhere





< c < 1
F(c) = \ 1 - (2 - c)
2
/ 2 1 < c < 2
I 1 c >2
The triangular distribution has a special characteristic, i.e. it has two distributions
over the interval of [0, 2]. The dividing limit of the interval is the mode value of the
distribution.
Definition of the bidding function for cost interval [0, 1]
E(tc) = (b - c)*(l - F(c)) = (b - c)*(l - b2/2)
The bidders' expected profit E(n) is maximized if the dE(7t)/db =
dE(7i)/db = (1 - b
2




/2 - b2 + b*c = -3* b2/2 + b*c +1 =
Applying the Quadratic Formula:





This is the bidding function for players over the interval [0, 1] of the triangular
distribution
Definition of the bidding function for cost interval [1, 2]
E(tc) = (b - c)*(2 - b) 2/2 is the bidders' expected profit E(7t).The bidders' expected
profit is maximized if dE(7i)/db = 0.
dE(7i)/db = l/2*((2 - b)
2
+ 2*(b - c)* (2 - b)*(-l)) =
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(2 - b)*(2 - b - 2*b + 2*c) =
b = (2 + 2*c)/3
This is the players' bidding function over interval [1, 2] of the triangular
distribution. This Thesis will use the derived formulas to simulate the equilibrium strategy
of the bidders with a triangular cost distribution.
2. Bidding for Contract Games with Three Bidders
Assume that three bidders are competing for a contract and the bidders'
production cost cj has a triangular distribution over the range [0, 2] with mode [1].
Definition of the bidding function for cost interval [0, 1]
E(7i) = (b - c)*(l - F(c))2 = (b - c)*((l - b2/2))
2
The bidders' expected profit E(ri), is maximized if dE(7t)/db =









/2 - 2* (b - c)) =
Which is true if -5* b2/2 + 2*b*c +1 =
Applying the Quadratic Formula:
b = [2*c + (4*c2 +10)°- 5]/5
This is the players' bidding function for the interval [0, 1] of the triangular
distribution
Definition of the bidding function for cost interval [1, 2]
E(tc) = (b - c)*[(2 - b) 2]
2
/2 = [(b - c)*(2 - b)
4
]/2
The bidders' expected profit E(7i), is maximized if dE(7i)/db =
d E(7i)/db = (2 - b)
4





*(2 - b - 4*b + 4*c) =
b = (2 + 4*c)/5
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This is the bidding function for the players for the interval of [1, 2] of the
triangular distribution. This Thesis will use the derived formulas to simulate the
equilibrium strategy of the bidders with triangular cost distribution.
F. SUMMARY
This Chapter has explored auctioning theory. In the first part of the Chapter, the
class of the games to which auctioning activity belongs were analyzed and defined as non-
cooperative games with incomplete information. The second part of this Chapter analyzed
the bidding for contract game. The third part of this Chapter summarized the basics of
order statistics, which will later be used to control the simulation outcome. The theoretical
description of the game provided the opportunity to find the bidders' equilibrium
strategies.
This thesis assumes that all the bidding firms are equally efficient; their cost
distributions are identical. Further it is assumed, that the bidders' costs distribution is
either uniform or triangular over an interval of [1, h]. The distribution is known to all
bidders. These assumptions were used to define the equilibrium bidding function. After
defining the normal-form representation of the bidding for contract game, this Chapter
derived the equilibrium bidding function for the those games that analyzed here. The




m. SIMULATION OF THE FPSBA
This Chapter verifies the results derived in the previous Chapters using computer
simulations. The first section of the Chapter characterizes the model used to simulate the
FPSBA processes. The second part of the Chapter summarizes the simulation results and
the insights gained from simulating the bidding for contract games. The first simulations
assume that the production cost has a uniform distribution; the second simulations assume
that the production cost satisfies a triangular distribution. In concluding, the Chapter
summarizes the FPSBA simulation findings.
A. THE FPSBA MODEL
This section of the thesis will develop a FPSBA model for simulating the bidding
for contract game. After analyzing bidder behavior and using the findings from Chapter n,
this section provides a mathematical model of FPSBA. The mathematical model will be
transformed into computer code to conduct the simulations.
1. Simulation of Processes in FPSBA
Simulation imitates real-world phenomenon, processes or systems. Simulation
generates an artificial history of a system, and observes that artificial history to make
judgments concerning the operating characteristics of the real-world system.
A model is defined as a representation of a system for the purposes of studying
the system. For most studies, it is not necessary to consider all the details of a system;
thus a model is not only a substitute for the system, it is also a simplification of the
system. On the other hand the model should be sufficiently detailed to permit valid
conclusions to be drawn about the real system. [Ref 14]
By developing a simulation model we can study the processes and behavior of the
system, and its changes over time. To model a system it is necessary to understand the
system's concepts and boundaries. A system is often affected by the environment in which
the system is operating. These variables are considered to be the system environment.
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Models can be classified as being mathematical or physical. A mathematical model
uses symbolic notation and mathematical equations to simulate a system. Mathematical
models can be classified as deterministic or stochastic simulation models. A stochastic
model uses one or more random variables as inputs. These random inputs generate
random outputs. Since the outputs of the model are random, stochastic models can imitate
the real system. However, the simulation results must be treated as a statistical estimate of
the real-world system's characteristics.
In the case of FPSBA, the model represents the bidders and auctioneers. It
includes the rules and regulations of the auctions, the bidders' behavior, and their
attitudes. The actual and expected market conditions, the availability of resources and
other factors are also an influential part of the FPSBA system. The elaborated FPSBA
system model incorporates some of these variables. However, to keep the model
manageable, a number of simplifications have been made.
2. Information Space of the Game and Strategic Behavior of the Bidder
This section will analyze one of the most important aspects of the model, the
bidders' and the buyer's characteristics. The bidding environment will be analyzed as well.
Because of the wide variety in bidding regulations, this thesis assumes regulations are met
both by the bidders and the buyer. Both parties comply with the applicable law at the time
of the auction.
a. Information Space ofthe Auction
We assume that the FPSBA is a non-cooperative game in which the players
have limited information. However, the players know the following:
1 . The buyer is fully committed not to deviate from the FPSBA rules during the
auction process, even if the deviation is in the buyer's interest. The rules of the
auctions are common knowledge.
26
2. The bidders' utility function is defined by a von Neuman — Morgenstein utility
function U(-), and it is common for all bidders.
3. The bidders know their production cost (cj) with certainty when they bid and
this cost is private information known only to the bidder. However, the bidders
have subjective assumptions about the range and distribution of production
costs for other bidders. This Thesis assumes that the probability distribution for
each bidder is the same; it follows either a uniform or a triangular probability
distribution over the production cost range.
4. The bidders know with certainty the number of participants submitting bids.
5. While preparing for auctions, the bidders send signals, sometimes misleading,
about their cost to other bidders. However, cooperation between the bidders is
restricted.
b. The Players ' Strategic Behavior
A number of assumptions about the bidders will be made to construct a
comprehensive FPSBA model. The buyer and the bidder are expected to act rationally.
The rationality of the bidders means that:
1. The bidders pursue their own self interest; they attempt to maximize their
profit from the auction. Bidders maximize profits by submitting the highest
possible bid. However, the bidders recognize that they are constrained by the
other participants' bids. The higher the bid, the lower the probability of
winning the auction. This self-regulating mechanism provides an efficient
solution for the game.
2. Bidders consider their production costs and the production costs of the other
bidders. The resulting bids form a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Bidders using
the equilibrium strategy simultaneously maximize the expected profit regarding
both their and other participants' expected bids.
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3. The buyer and the bidders are risk neutral. The risk neutrality assumption is
disputable. This thesis assumes risk neutrality to simplify the model
formulation, the calculations and the description of the bidders' strategic
behavior.
3. Model Description
Consider a competitive bidding model in which the buyer announces a contract to
procure a specified commodity. This Thesis assumes that there are n bidders for a
particular procurement and they are responsive and responsible. It is assumed that bids are
solicited and the contract awarded to the lowest bidder; the bids differ only in price. The
contract specifies the winning firm's total receipts from the buyer. The winner's expected
profit depends both on the bid submitted and the cost incurred. In turn, the bids are
influenced by the firm's expectation about the competing bids.
The constructed model attempts to capture the major and decisive characteristics
of the real FPSBA process. However, this model is only a first approximation of many
procurement procedures. The model provides an opportunity to experiment with the
bidders' possible actions and decisions during FPSBA. The proposed FPSBA model
assumes symmetry of information and preferences, which makes it possible to concentrate
exclusively on a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
4. The Computer Simulation Methodology
This thesis used a personal computer and Excel 5.0 spreadsheet software to
simulate the FPSBA process. The computer simulation flowchart is in Figure 2. A
computer program was written to conduct the necessary operations to simulate the
process. The simulation results were collected in a separate worksheet. The composed







































Figure 2 The computer simulation flowchart
The bidder's initial production cost, which was a random variable during the entire
simulation process, was generated by Excel' s built-in random number generator. The built
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in random number generator provides a random number distributed uniformly over the
interval [0 , 1]. If it was necessary, the generated random number was transformed using
the Inverse Transformation Technique. [Ref 14:pg. 299]
B. EXPERIMENTATION UNDER A UNIFORM COST DISTRIBUTION
This section of the Chapter describes the FPSBA simulation when the production
costs are distributed according to the uniform distribution. The first part of the section
explains the mathematical simulation model; the later part presents the simulation results.
1. The Mathematical Model for Simulation
Consider a situation where all firms are equally efficient and their cost distributions
are identical. In particular, assume that the bidders' potential production costs are
distributed uniformly over an interval [h, 1].
For this case:
- the probability density function of cost is f(c) = l/(h - 1)
- the probability distribution function of cost is F(c) = (c - a)/(h - 1)
Where: h - upper limit ofthe cost range
1 - lower limit of the cost range
Determining the equilibrium strategies requires simultaneously analyzing all the
bidding decisions. The model incorporates Chapter II' s findings about the bidders'
equilibrium strategy.
A bidding strategy defines the relationship between the bidder's proposal, bi, and
cost C;. Appendix A derives the bidding functions for the simulated game. The bidding
functions take the general form:
bi = ((h-l) + (n-l)* Ci)/n
With two bidders, the bidding function takes the form:
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bi = (1 + Ci)/2 and b2 = (1 + c2)/2
for Bidder 1 and Bidder 2, respectively.
With three bidders, the bidding function takes the form:
bi = (1 + 2*ci)/3 and b2 = (1 + 2*c2)/3 and b3 = (1 + 2*c3)/3
for Bidder 1, Bidder 2 and Bidder 3, respectively.
These formulas mathematically articulate the bidders' behavior. They reflect the
bidders' expected bidding decision described in the previous section. This thesis assumes
that the bidder's production cost was drawn from the stated distribution. The bidders' cost
was simulated with a random number generator.
2. Random Number Generation
This thesis applied the Built-in Random Number Generator of the Excel 5.0
spreadsheet software to generate uniformly distributed random numbers over the required
interval. The built-in random number generator provides with random number over the
interval [0, 1]. The simulations often use different cost distribution intervals. Therefor, the
generated random numbers were transformed as necessary.
The required random number transformation was based on:
R = (h-l)*Rand() + l
Where: R - required random number
1 - lower limit of the required random number
h - upper limit of the required random number
Rand() - the Excel generated random number
3. Experimental Setting for FPSBA with Two Bidders
This section assumes that two bidders are bidding for a contract, and the lowest
bid wins. The bidder's production cost is distributed between [0, 1] according to the
uniform distribution. The generated cost numbers are analyzed. This Thesis used the Excel
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built-in statistical analyses program package to examine the quality of random numbers
used during the simulations. The analysis result are shown in Appendix E.
During the simulation, three different scenarios were assumed and analyzed. In the
first scenario, both bidders used equilibrium strategies. In the second scenario, one of the
bidders used the equilibrium strategy while the other bidder used non-equilibrium strategy.
In the third scenario, both of the bidders used a non-equilibrium strategy.
The different scenarios were designed to illustrate the theoretical finding that the
equilibrium bidding strategy of the bidders is a strategy that maximizes the bidders' payoff.
Any deviation from the equilibrium strategy would reduce expected profit for the
deviating bidder. The numerical simulation results are shown in the Appendix C.
a. Graphic Presentation ofthe Computer Simulations Results
The simulation was used to find an equilibrium in the bidding for contract
game. The bidders' average expected profit can demonstrate the presence of an
equilibrium strategy. If the bidders achieve equal average profit in a series of auctions
conducted under the same conditions, this outcome represents the equilibrium of the
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Figure 3 Expected profit from winning the auction
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Figure 3 shows there exits a well-defined equilibrium in these games. The
winning bidders' expected profit if they win the auction approaches 0.334 as the number
of simulated auctions approaches 1500. The simulation showed that the bidders won
equally, and their expected profit approached to the analytical computed result 0.3333.
The computation is shown in Appendix B.
The average profit per auction considers all auctions in which the bidder
participates. It better characterizes the bidders' expectations and their motivations. The
bidder seeks to maximize the average profit per auctions not the profit per auction won. In
the following simulations, this Thesis used the average profit from bidding to analyze the
outcomes of the different bidding strategies. The average expected profit graph, shown on
Figure 4, reinforces the existence of a well-defined equilibrium in these games. The
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Figure 4. Average profit from bidding ~ both bidders using equilibrium strategy
An equilibrium strategy should also simultaneously maximize both bidders'
profits. If a strategy maximizes the bidders' payoff, no-bidder is willing to deviate from the
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strategy. This is an equilibrium of the game. This equilibrium condition was explored in
the next simulation. The simulation results are shown in Figure 5.
In this simulation, one of the bidders ~ Bidder 1 — used a non-equilibrium
strategy. This simulation assumed that Bidder l's bid was 0.1 higher than the non-
equilibrium strategy. The bidding function for the bidder was












Figure 5 Average profit from the bidding ~ bidder 1 using non- equilibrium
strategy
The simulation revealed that the deviant bidder's profit was lower than the
profit using the equilibrium strategy. The bidder playing the equilibrium strategy ~ Bidder
2 ~ received higher profits in this game compared to the game in which both players used
the equilibrium strategy. To control the simulation result, an other simulation was
conducted with different non-equilibrium strategy.
In this case, Bidder 2 used a non-equilibrium strategy described with
bidding function:
b2 = [(l+c2)/2]-0.1















Figure 6 Average profit from the bidding ~ Bidder 2 using a non - equilibrium
strategy
The simulation revealed that the deviant bidder's profit was lower after
deviating from the equilibrium strategy. However, in this situation the equilibrium strategy
bidder did not achieve higher profit. The deviant 'low" bids made Bidder 2 win more
often than Bidder 1 . This reduced the profits for both of the bidders, even if Bidder 1
played the equilibrium strategy.
To further support the existence of an equilibrium strategy, the next
scenario assumed both bidders deviated from their equilibrium strategy. The simulation
was used to ascertain if either could achieve a higher average payoff in this case. This
simulation assumed that the deviation from equilibrium is random, as opposed to the
previous two cases when the deviant bidder used systematic non-equilibrium strategies.
The bidding function is given by:
bi = (l+Ci)/2(+or-Mi)
Where: Mj - Random number between [0, 0.5] for Bidder 1 and [0, 0.3]
for Bidder 2
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The addition or subtraction of the random number depended on the value
of random number M;. If M; was less than 0.3 for Bidder 1, and it was less than 0.1 for
Bidder 2, than M; was added otherwise it was subtracted from the equilibrium bid.

















Figure 7 Average profit from bidding — both of the bidders using a non-
equilibrium strategy
This simulation shows that the average profit curves do not follow any
defined pattern, though they intersect at one point. Figure 7 also demonstrates that both of
the bidders had lower payoffs in this case compare to the two previous simulations.
b. Summary
After analyzing the results of the two-bidder computer simulation, it can be
claimed that:
1 . The simulation of the bidding for contract game is valid. The computation
completed in Appendix B shows 0.3333 as an expected difference between the
lowest and the highest costs. The expected difference between the highest and
the lowest cost is the winner's profit. The simulation found 0.334 as the
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winners' average profit after 1500 simulated auctions. Further simulations
would approach the theoretical results.computation is shown in Appendix B.
2. The average profit per auction better characterizes the bidders' expectations
and their motivations. The bidder seeks to maximize the average profit per
auctions not the profit per auction won. The average expected profit graph,
shown on Figure 4, reinforces the existence of a well-defined equilibrium in
these games. The bidders' average profit approaches 0.167 as the number of
simulated auctions approaches 1500.
3. The equilibrium strategy maximizes the bidders' expected average profit;
deviations from the equilibrium strategy cause an expected loss for the deviant
bidder.
4. If the deviation from the equilibrium strategy is negative, i.e., bids are below
the equilibrium bid, both of the bidders have lower expected profits.
5. If the bidder follows equilibrium strategy, and its opponent deviates from
equilibrium strategy in a positive direction, the equilibrium strategy bidder's
expected profit will be higher on average.
The change in number of competing bidders has a significant impact on the
outcomes of the bidding for contract game. The following section of this Chapter will
analyze this effect.
4. Experimental Setting for FPSBA with Three Bidders
This simulation was conducted to find the effect on the game equilibrium of
changing the number of bidders. The simulation assumed that three participants were
bidding for a contract, the lowest bid wins. The bidders' production costs are distributed
between [0, 1], according to the uniform distribution.
During the simulation, three different scenarios were analyzed, as in two-bidder
simulation case. In the first scenario, all the bidders used the equilibrium strategy. In the
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second scenario, two bidders used the equilibrium strategy while the other bidder used a
non-equilibrium strategy. In the third scenario all the bidders used non-equilibrium
strategies.
The scenarios were designed to support the theoretical finding that the bidders'
equilibrium strategy is dominant. In other words, the equilibrium strategy maximizes the
payoff to all the bidders. Deviating from the equilibrium strategy reduces the payoff for the
deviating bidder. The numerical simulation results are shown in Appendix C.
a. Graphic Presentation ofthe Computer Simulation Results
Figure 8 shows there is a well-defined equilibrium in the three person
equilibrium strategy game, as in the two-player game. Figure 8 indicates that the winning















Figure 8 Expected profit from winning the auction
The simulation indicates that increasing the number of bidders requires
mores auctions to converge to the equilibrium average profit. Introducing an additional
competitor decreased the average expected profit from 0.333 with two bidders to 0.25.
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The average profit per auction considers all auctions in which the bidder
participates. It is a better characteristics for the bidders expectations and their motivations.
The bidder seeks to maximize the average profit per auctions not the profit per auction
won. The average expected profit graph is shown in Figure 9.
The average expected profit graph reinforces the existence of a well-
defined equilibrium in these games. The bidders' average profit approaches 0.835 as the
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Figure 9 Average profit from bidding — all of the bidders used equilibrium strategy
An equilibrium strategy should also simultaneously maximize all bidders'
profits. If a strategy maximizes the bidders' payoff, no-bidder is willing to deviate from the
strategy. This is an equilibrium of the game. This equilibrium condition was explored in
the next simulations.
In these simulations, one of the bidders ~ Bidder 3 ~ used a non-
equilibrium strategy. First, Bidder 3's bids 0.2 more than the equilibrium strategy. The
bidding function was:
b3 = [(l+2*c3)/3] + 0.2
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Figure 10 Average profit from bidding ~ Bidder 3 using non-equilibrium strategy
Simulation ofbidding with one non-equilibrium bidder reveals that:
1. the bidders playing the equilibrium strategy (Bidder 1 and Bidder 2) can
achieve a higher average payoff compare to the game where all the players
used the equilibrium strategy.
2. the non-equilibrium player receives a lower average profit than under the
equilibrium strategy.
To verify the simulation result, a second simulation was conducted with a
different non-equilibrium strategy. In this case Bidder 3 used strategy described by bidding
function:
b3 = [(l+2*c3)/3]-0.15
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Figure 1 1 Average profit from bidding, Bidder 3 using a non-equilibrium strategy
The simulation revealed that the deviant bidder's profit was lower in this
case compare to the equilibrium strategy. However, the competing bidders in this situation
did not achieve higher profits. With the deviant 'low" bids, Bidder 3 won more often than
Bidder 1 and Bidder 2, Bidder 3's lower bid and more frequent winning lowered the
profits for all bidders, even the equilibrium strategy bidders.
To further support the existence of an equilibrium strategy, the next
scenario assumed all bidders deviate from their equilibrium strategy. The simulation was
used to ascertain if any bidders could achieve higher average payoff in this case. This
simulation assumed a random deviation from the equilibrium. The bidding function for all
bidders is:
bi = (1 + 2*Ci)/( 3 + 0.6*Rand()) i = 1, 2, 3
Simulation results are shown in Figure 12. This simulation shows that the
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Figure 12 Average profit from bidding —all bidders using non-equilibrium strategy
If the bidders followed a non-symmetric random deviation from their
equilibrium strategy, the expected average profit curve not have a consistent pattern.
Figure 12 also demonstrates that all bidders had lower payoffs in this case compared to the
equilibrium strategy simulation.
b. Summary
After analyzing the results of the three-bidder computer simulation, it can
be asserted that:
1. The simulation showed an average payoff of winning approaches 0.25 after
2000 simulated auctions. This result confirms the theoretical prediction that
number of bidders in the bidding for contract games is one of the decisive
elements. The higher the number of the bidders, the lower the bidders'
expected profit. The theoretical calculation of average expected profit in the
three-bidder game is shown in Appendix B. The computed value of the first
and second lowest costs differences gives the auction winner's expected
average profit . The simulated expected profit was 0.2507; further simulations
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would approach the theoretical result. The average expected profit graph
reinforces the existence of a well-defined equilibrium in these games. The
bidders' average profit approaches 0.0835 as the number of simulated auctions
approaches 2500.
2. The equilibrium strategy maximizes the bidders' expected average profit;
deviations from the equilibrium strategy cause an expected loss for the deviant
bidder, as in two-bidder simulation.
3. If the deviation in bidding is negative, i.e. bids are below the equilibrium
strategy, then all bidders had lower expected payoffs. If one bidder deviates
from equilibrium strategy in positive direction, than the expected profit of the
equilibrium strategy will be higher on average.
5. End Result of the Simulations with Uniform Distribution
After analyzing the computer simulations for the uniform cost distribution, it can
be observed that:
1. The conducted simulations validate the constructed FPSBA model. The
simulation results approached the theoretical results indicated by the order
statistics computed for the two and three bidders cases. The simulation results
converge to the theoretical results if sufficient auctions are simulated.
2. The equilibrium strategy maximizes the bidders' expected average profit;
deviating from the equilibrium strategy reduces profits for the deviant bidder.
The non-equilibrium strategy reduces average profits for all the bidders if the
deviation is below the equilibrium bid.
3. Adding a new competitor to the game does not change the nature of the game;
the additional competitor lowers the expected bid and the average expected
profit.
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C. EXPERIMENTATION UNDER A TRIANGULAR COST DISTRIBUTION
The FPSBA simulation using a triangular production cost distribution defines the
bidders' behavior under a different cost condition. The uniform production cost
distribution was used primarily for simplicity, though it is reasonable when there is no ex-
ante information about the bidders' production costs. The triangular distribution may be a
better approximation of reality. By manipulating the triangular distribution's mean value,
average deviation, and minimum and maximum values, one can obtain a first order
approximation of the bidders' production cost distribution.
1. The Mathematical Model for Simulation
Consider a situation where all firms are equally efficient and their probability
distributions of cost are identical. In particular, assume bidders' costs are distributed
according to the same triangular probability distribution. The range of their production
cost is defined over the interval [1, h]; it has a mode value m with probability 2/(h - 1). For
the general case, suppose that the bidders' costs have been distributed according to




f 2*(c - l)/(h - l)*(m - 1) 1 < c < m
%) = i 2*(h - c)/(h - l)*(h - m) m < c < h
1 elsewhere
2. The cumulative distribution function:
f c<l
I (c - 1)
2
/(h - l)*(m - 1) Kc<m
F(c) = i 1- (h - c)
2
/(h - l)*(h - m) m < c < h
I 1 c>h
where: 1 - lower limit of the bidders' cost distribution
h - upper limit of the bidders' cost distribution
m - the mode of the distribution (in extreme 1 = m or h = m
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A bidding strategy defines the a relationship between the bidder's proposal, bi and




For the production cost interval 1 < c < m
n*l + (n - l)*c + {( n*l + (n - l)*c)
2
+ 2*[((n - 1) + 0.5)* (Kl - l2 - 2*( n-l)*c*l)]} " 5
b =
2*[(n-l) + 0.5]
Where: Kl = (h - l)*(m - 1)
2. For the production cost interval of 1 < c < m
h + 2*(n- l)*c
b =
2*(n - 1) + 1
The derivation of the general bidding function can be found in Appendix A.
In deriving the bidding functions for the computer simulation, it was assumed that:
1 = 0, h = 2 , m = 1, the simulation assumed that there was either two or three
competitors. Substituting these assumptions into the general equilibrium bidding function
yields:
1 Two participant equilibrium bidding strategy:
b; = if < Ci < 1
3
2 + 2*c;
bj= if 1 < Ci < 2
3









= if 1 < cj < 2
5
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2. Random Number Generation
The Excel 5.0 built in random number generator provides random numbers. The
random numbers are uniformly distributed over the interval [0, 1]. The following
simulations need random numbers distributed according to a triangular distribution.
Uniformly distributed random numbers can be converted to a triangular distribution using
inverse transformation technique. [Ref. 14: pg. 300]
According to this method:
c = 1 + (R*(m - l)*(h - 1))° 5 for 1 < c < m and
c = h - (R*(h - m)*(h - 1))° 5 for m < c < h
where: c - triangularly distributed random variables
R - uniformly distributed random number generated by Excel 5.0
The generated cost numbers were analyzed. This Thesis used the Excel built-in
statistical analyses program package to examine the quality of random numbers used
during the simulations. The analytical result are shown in Appendix E.
3. Setting for the Computer Simulation of FPSBA of Two Bidders
Computer simulation of the FPSBA was conducted using an Excel spreadsheet.
This setting assumes two competing bidders; the lowest bid wins. The bidders' production
cost is distributed between [0, 2] according to the triangular distribution
with mode value [1]. The constructed computer program, written as an adjustable macro
in Visual Basic language, followed the mathematical model of the bidding for contract
game. The applied macro is shown in Appendix D. The macro devised bids for each
participant and collected the auction results in a separate worksheet.
During the simulation, three different scenarios were analyzed. In the first scenario,
both bidders used the equilibrium strategy. The second scenario assumed that one of the
bidders used an equilibrium strategy, while the other used a non-equilibrium strategy. In
the third scenario both of the bidders used non-equilibrium strategies.
46
The different scenarios show the that the equilibrium bidding strategy is a
dominant strategy. In other words, the equilibrium strategy yields the maximum payoff for
both of the bidders. Any deviation from the equilibrium strategy reduces profit for the
deviant bidder. The numerical simulation results are shown in Appendix C.
a. Graphic Presentation ofthe Computer Simulation Results
The simulation was used to find an equilibrium in the bidding for contract
game. The bidders' average expected profit demonstrates the presence of an equilibrium
strategy. An equilibrium of the game occurs when the bidders achieve equal average
profits in a series of auctions conducted under the same conditions.
Figure 13 shows there exits a well-defined equilibrium in these games. The
bidders' average profit approaches 0.196 as the number of simulated auctions approaches
1500.
0.250






Figure 13 Average profit from bidding — bidders used equilibrium strategy
An equilibrium strategy should also maximize both bidders' profits. If a
strategy maximizes the bidders' payoff, no-bidder is willing to deviate from the strategy.
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This is an equilibrium of the game. This equilibrium condition was explored in the
following simulations. In this simulation, one of the bidders used a non-equilibrium
strategy. In particular, the bid was 0.25 above the equilibrium strategy. In particular, the
Bidder l's bidding function is given by:
c 1 + (c 12 + 6)05
b, = + 0.25
3
2 + 2*ci
b, = + 0.25
3
if < Ci < 1
if 1 < Ci < 2
The simulation revealed that the deviant bidder's average profit was lower
compared to the equilibrium strategy. The bidder playing the equilibrium strategy ~
Bidder2 ~ received a higher profit in this game compared to the case where both players





Figure 14 Average profit from bidding ~ Bidder 1 used non-equilibrium strategy
To reinforce this simulation result, another simulation was conducted with
a different non-equilibrium strategy.
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In this case, Bidder 1 used non-equilibrium strategy described with bidding
function:
b,=




0.25 if < c; < 1
2 + 2ci
b,= 0.25 if 1 < c; < 2
This scenario assumes that Bidder 1 bids below the equilibrium bid. As a
result, Bidder 1 will win more contract, but earn a lower expected profit from the















Figure 1 5 Average profit from bidding ~ Bidder 1 used non-equilibrium strategy
The simulation revealed that the deviant bidder's profit was lower
compared to the equilibrium strategy. In this situation, the equilibrium strategy bidder also
received a lower profit compared to the case where both of the bidders used the
equilibrium bidding strategy. The deviant 'low" bids allowed Bidder 1 to win more
contracts, reducing the equilibrium bidder's expected profit.
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To further verify the equilibrium strategy, the next scenario assumes both
bidders deviate from the equilibrium strategy. The simulation was used to ascertain if
either participant could achieve a higher average payoff in this case. This simulation
assumed that the deviation from equilibrium is random. The bidding function is:
bi =





< c; < 1
Where:
2 + 2ci
b,= if 1 < c; < 2
3 + R
R — is a uniform random number generated by Excel' s built-in random
number generator.
This scenario assumed that both of the Bidders sometimes reduce their
equilibrium bid to win the contract. The bidders sacrificed average profit per contract to
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Figure 16 Average profit from bidding — Bidders used non-equilibrium strategy
This simulation shows that the average profit curves do not follow any
defined pattern. Though the average profit curves intersect, the non-equilibrium strategy
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does not provide a defined average cost pattern. Figure 16 also demonstrates that both of
the bidders had lower payoffs in this case compared to the two previous simulations.
b. Summary
After analyzing the results of the two-bidder computer simulation, it can be
observed that:
1. The change in the production cost probability distribution does not
substantially change the general results of the FPSBA. However, it does affect
the specific values of the bids and the bidders' expected average profit. To
better approximate the difference between the expected average profits, a two
bidders simulation with a uniform distribution over the range [0, 2] was
conducted. The expected average payoff of the bidders was 0.334, which is
80% higher than 0.196 — the expected average profit with a triangular
distribution over the same range.
2. The equilibrium strategy maximizes the bidders' expected average profit;




If the deviant bid is below the equilibrium strategy, then both of the bidders
had lower expected payoffs. If the deviant bid is above the equilibrium strategy
then expected profit is higher for the equilibrium strategy bidder.
4. Experimental Setting FPSBA with Three Bidders
This simulation was conducted to find the effect of changing the number of bidders
on the game equilibrium. The simulation assumes that three participants bid for a contract;
the lowest bid wins. The bidders' production costs are assumed to be distributed
according to a triangular distribution between [0, 2], with mode value [1].
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During the simulation, three different scenarios were analyzed as in two bidder
simulation. In the first scenario, all the bidders used the equilibrium strategy. In the second
scenario, two bidders used the equilibrium strategy while one bidder used a non-
equilibrium strategy. In the third scenario, all the bidders used a non-equilibrium strategy.
The scenarios were designed to support the theoretical finding that the bidders'
equilibrium strategy is dominant. In other words, the equilibrium strategy maximizes the
payoff to all the bidders. Deviating from the equilibrium strategy reduces the payoff for the
deviating bidder. The numerical simulation results are shown in Appendix C.
a. Graphic Presentation ofthe Computer Simulation Results
The simulation was used to find an equilibrium in the bidding for contract
game. The bidders' average expected profit demonstrates the presence of an equilibrium
strategy. If the bidders achieve equal average profit in a series of auctions conducted
under the same conditions, this outcome represents the equilibrium ofthe game.
Figure 17 shows that there exits a well-defined equilibrium in these games.
The bidders' average profit approaches 0.105 as the number of simulated auctions
approaches 1500.






Figure 17 Average profit from bidding ~ Bidders using equilibrium strategy
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In next simulation, one of the bidders — Bidder 3 ~ used a non-equilibrium
strategy. This simulation assumed that Bidder 3's bid was 0.1 more than the equilibrium
strategy.











if < c; < 1
if 1 < Ci < 2
The simulation revealed that the deviant bidder's profit was lower
compared to the equilibrium strategy. The bidders playing the equilibrium strategy —
Bidders 1 and 2 ~ received higher profits in this game than in the game where all players
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Figure 1 8 Average profit from bidding ~ Bidder 3 using a non-equilibrium strategy
To verify this result, another simulation was conducted with a different
non-equilibrium strategy. In this case Bidder 3 used a non-equilibrium strategy described










if < q < 1
if 1 < Ci < 2
This simulation revealed that the deviant bidder's profit was lower
compared to the equilibrium strategy. However, in this situation the competing bidders
also had lower profits. The deviant 'low" bids helped Bidder 3 win more contracts than
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Figure 1 9 Average profit from bidding ~ Bidder 3 using a non-equilibrium strategy
To further verify the existence of an equilibrium strategy, the next scenario
assumes all bidders deviate from their equilibrium strategy. The simulation was used to
ascertain if any bidder could achieve a higher average payoff in this case.
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This simulation assumed a random deviation from equilibrium, as opposed
to a systematic non-equilibrium strategy. The bidding functions are given by:
b,=
b; =





if < Ci < 1
if 1 < Ci < 2
Figure 20 shows that the average profit curves in this case follow a defined
pattern. The random but symmetric bidding strategy generates this outcome. If the bidders
used non-symmetric random deviations from their equilibrium strategy, then the expected









Figure 20 Average profit from bidding — All Bidders using a non-equilibrium
strategy
Figure 20 also demonstrates that all bidders had lower payoffs in this case,
compared to the equilibrium strategy simulation.
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b. Summary
After analyzing the results of the three-bidder computer simulation, it can
be claimed that:
1. The simulation converged to an average payoff of 0.105 after 1500 simulated
auctions. This result confirms the theoretical prediction that number of bidders
is one of the decisive elements. The higher the number of the bidders, the lower
their expected profit.
2. The equilibrium strategy maximizes the bidders' expected average profit;
deviations from the equilibrium strategy reduce profit for the deviant bidder, as
in the two bidder simulation.
3. If the deviant bid is below the equilibrium strategy, then all bidders had lower
expected payoffs. If the deviant bid is above the equilibrium strategy, then the
equilibrium strategy bidders have a higher expected profit on average.
5. Conclusions from the Simulations with Triangular Distribution
1
.
Changing the production cost distribution did not affect the general results, but
substantially altered the expected numerical outcomes of the simulated FPSBA,
both in two and three bidder simulations. The difference between the expected
average profit derives from the probability distributions' characteristics.
2. The equilibrium strategy maximizes the bidders' expected average profit;
deviating from the equilibrium bid reduces profit for the deviant bidder. The
non-equilibrium strategy reduces the average profit for all bidders if the deviant
bid is below the equilibrium bid.
3. Adding additional competitors to the game does not change the nature of the




The FPSBA simulation revealed the bidders' fundamental characteristics in the
bidding for contract games. The model assumptions helped to isolate the most influential
factors, however assuming risk neutrality for the bidders is dubious. The computer
simulation results affirm:
1. The equilibrium strategy maximizes the bidders expected average profit; it
appear to be a dominant strategy. Changes in the cost distribution do not effect
this pattern; however, the specific values of the expected profit did change with
the cost distribution.
2. The number of computing bidders is another influential factor in FPSBA. The
additional competitors reduce both the average bid and the average profit.
However, the additional competitor did not change the nature of the game.
3. Deviations from the equilibrium strategy cause an expected loss for the deviant
bidder. If the deviation is below the equilibrium strategy, all the bidders receive
lower expected payoffs.
4. If the deviant bid is above the equilibrium strategy, it increases the expected
profit of the equilibrium strategy bidder.
5. The bidding for contract game simulation appears to be valid. The difference
between the computed and simulated results is insignificant. The computations





To motivate the conclusions with recommendations, the research questions posed
in Chapter I will be reviewed and discussed. In addressing each of the primary and
subsidiary research questions, this Chapter will discuss the theoretical basis of the FPSBA
simulation described in Chapter II. The experiment's findings, presented in Chapter HI,
will be the conclusions' foundation. Following these discussions, recommendations will be
provided regarding the application of the FPSBA simulation in the HDF's acquisition
practice; and further research areas will also be outlined.
A. FPSBA RESEARCH QUESTIONS
As presented in Chapter I the primary research question was: How do profit
maximizing suppliers choose their bids in a competitive environment? Before answering
this question each subsidiary question will be answered.
1. Subsidiary Questions and Discussion
This discussion will clarify the answer to the primary question and provide the
foundation for recommendations.
a. Subsidiary Question 1
Does the FPSBA have a game equilibrium, and if it has, what are the
equilibrium strategies of the bidders? Chapter II of the thesis analyzed and reviewed the
auctioning theory. The bidding for contract game had been classified as a specific instance
of a static non-cooperative game with incomplete information. The theory predicts that
these games have an equilibrium. This Thesis found and analyzed the symmetric linear
equilibrium in bidding for contract games.
Chapter II derived the equilibrium strategies for the bidder when the
bidders' production cost has either a uniform or triangular distribution. The resulting
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equations — called bidding functions ~ were used to conduct the FPSBA simulations.
Several assumptions were made about the bidders' information space and strategic
behavior. These assumptions provide a better understanding of the game and made it
easier to construct the bidding for contract game model. The developed model was used
to compose the simulation algorithm and the code for the computer simulations. This
thesis used Excel 5.0 spreadsheet software and Visual Basic language to conduct the
simulations.
The first simulation was conducted with a uniform cost distribution. The
first of the three simulated FPSBA scenarios defined the existence of the theoretically
predicted game equilibrium. The simulation conducted with the equilibrium bidding
function supported the theoretical prediction. The simulated auctions provided
approximately equal average expected payoffs for the bidders. The two-bidders'
equilibrium strategy simulation result was used to validate the applied simulation model.
The expected difference between the two bids, computed by using order statistics, is the
expected average profit for the winner. The order statistics results were virtually identical
with the simulation's results. Considering both the theoretical predictions, and the
simulations conducted both for the uniform and triangular distributions, there exists a
well-defined symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the FPSBA games.
The revealed game equilibrium and the proven existence of the equilibrium
strategy provide the opportunity to predict some behavior of the potential suppliers.
However, the user should be aware of the probabilistic character of the simulated game. It
cannot forecast the actual behavior of the bidders in a particular auction but it can
approximate the general pattern and the expected average wining bid with a reasonable
accuracy.
b. Subsidiary Question 2
Do the bidders have a dominant strategy in First Price Sealed Bid
Auctions? An equilibrium strategy should also simultaneously maximize the bidders'
profits. If a strategy maximizes the bidders' payoff, no-bidder is willing to deviate from the
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strategy. This is an equilibrium of the game. This equilibrium condition was explored in
simulations where one of the bidders deviated from the equilibrium strategy. Another
scenario explored the consequences if all bidders used non equilibrium strategies.
The simulation results supported the theoretical prediction. Deviations
from the equilibrium strategy caused an expected loss for the deviant bidders. If the
deviation in bidding was negative i.e., bids were below the equilibrium strategy bids, then
the bidders achieved a lower expected payoff. If just one bidder deviated from the
equilibrium strategy in a positive direction, than the equilibrium strategy bidder's expected
profit was higher on average.
These findings support the assumption about the existence of an
equilibrium strategy in FPSBA. However, this equilibrium strategy does not satisfy the
strong criteria of equilibrium; the bidder should have a best bid regardless of how high he
believes the others will bid. 'Each bidder in the FPSBA chooses his best bid given his
guess (correct in equilibrium) of the decision rule being followed by the other bidders."
[Ref 4] That is why, the bidders in a FPSBA do not have a dominant strategy.
The game equilibrium satisfies the weak criterion ofNash equilibrium. This
Thesis did not analyze the entire scale of the potential equilibrium opportunity. The
assumed information symmetry and preference equality made it possible to analyze only
the symmetric Nash equilibrium in the game.
c. Subsidiary Question 3
How does the change in bidders' numbers affect the outcome of the
FPSBA ? One of the most influential factors affecting the game outcome is the number of
bidders involved in the FPSBA. The theory predicts this both for the uniform and
triangular cost distribution. The bidders' number is always present in the general form of
the bidding functions that supports the predictions. The conducted simulations supported
the theoretical prediction.
To extend the simulations' finding, the bidding function derived for n
bidders was used to represent how changing the participants' numbers affects the auctions'
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outcome. Figure 21 shows the changes in bids as a function of the bidders involved in the
game. The graph has been constructed with constant production costs, for the uniform
distribution over the cost range [0, 1].
Figure 21 was created for two costs, Ci = 0.8 and C2 = 0.4. As the Figure
indicates, the bidders' expected bids decrease if the bidders' number increases from two
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Figure 21 Expected bid as function of the bidders' number
The triangular distribution may better approximate the real costs than the
uniform distribution. Figure 22 shows the changes in bids as function of the bidders
involved into the game. This graph has been created with constant production cost, for the
triangular distribution over the cost range [0, 2].
Figure 22 was completed for two constant cost cases, Ci = 0.8 and C2 = 1.4.
As the Figure shows, the bidders' expected bid decreases dramatically as the bidders'
number increases from two to ten. Adding bidders beyond ten will not significantly
decrease the expected bid.
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Figure 22 Expected bid as function of the bidders' number
The participants' number influences the bidders' decision in FPSBA. The
bidders consider it a potential factor affecting the probability of winning the auction. The
higher the number of bids, the higher the probability that any given bid will not be the
lowest bid. The expected bid decreases as the participants' number increases.
d Subsidiary question 4
How does changing the cost distribution affect the outcome of the
FPSBA? Changing the probability distribution of production cost did not substantially
change the pattern of the FPSBA. The change, however, had a significant effect on the
value of the bids and the bidders' expected average profit. To define the difference
between the expected average profits, a simulation was conducted for uniform cost
distribution of [0, 2] and two bidders. The bidders' expected average payoff was 0.668,
which is 80% higher than the expected average profit with a triangular distribution over
the same range with mode [1].
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The following table presents how the change in bidders' numbers effects







the range [0, 1]
Uniform cost
distribution over
the range [0, 2]
Triangular cost
distribution over the range
[0, 2] with mode [1]
Two Bidders 0.168 0.334 0.196
Three Bidders 0.083 0.167 0.105
Table 1 Changes in expected average profit
The change in the cost distribution assumption has a substantial influence
on the FPSBA outcomes. However, it is not just the cost distribution that affects the
bidding outcomes. The bidders' perception about the cost for the other participants
influences their bids as well. This Thesis assumed that the cost distributions are common
knowledge among the bidders; it did not analyze the potential influence if the bidders have
different cost assumptions.
In reality, bidders and the buyer have asymmetric information about the
cost distribution. Each bidder has private information about their cost, but this cost is a
random variable influenced by several factors. The suppliers send signals about their cost
to the buyer and to each other. It is in the senders' interest to distort this information,
mostly in an increasing direction. The bidders and the buyer have to be aware of this
strategic misrepresentation and strategic misinterpretation.
e. Subsidiary Question 5
How can HDF use the findings of this Thesis in their acquisition
practice? Discussing subsidiary question 5, this section will make recommendations for
the HDF's procurement practice. Some finding of this Thesis can be applied without any
further considerations. However, several findings could be used as guidelines; these
finding should refer to the actual situation.
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Both the theory and the simulation revealed that the equilibrium strategy is
the strategy that maximizes the bidders' expected profit. The suppliers will likely use this
strategy when they formulate their bids in a real bidding for contract game. The
procurement practice can use this finding by projecting the expected winning bid. The
equations can use these projections to forecast the expected spending on procurement,
and to prepare negotiators for contract negotiations. The essence of these projections is
forecasting the accurate expected cost range. The simulation cannot correct forecasts
errors.
Findings regarding the number of bidders and their effect on the expected
bid can be used to establish the number of invited bidders. This thesis assumed that the
HDF does not incur costs during the tender evaluation process because reliable cost data
was missing. However, tender evaluation is not a cost-free procedure. Having data about
the cost of evaluation, the HDF can conduct a cost and benefit analyses based on these
data. Comparing the marginal costs and benefits the HDF may decide the number invited
to tender.
2. Primary Question and Discussion
Bidders in a FPSBA offer their bids based on the information they have available.
This Thesis assumed symmetry of information among the bidders. It further assumed that
the most important information ~ the bidder's own production cost ~ is private
information. The two most influential factors have been considered in building the FPSBA
model. The number of bidders invited has been explicitly included in the model. The
bidders' production cost assumption, the second influential factor, has been implicitly
included in the model by assuming the production cost distribution.
Preparing their bids, FPSBA bidders consider their own production cost, the other
bidders' production cost distribution, and the number of competing bidders. They predict
their own future production cost. They project their competitors' production costs based
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on experience. The bidders know the potential competitors' bidding habits and production
potentials.
This Thesis approximated the bidders' mutual experience and knowledge by a
probability distribution over production cost. The probability distribution of cost was
either uniform or triangular. The uniform distribution of production cost is applicable
when the buyer has no ex-ante information about the competing bidders' cost. The
triangular distribution applies when the buyer has some information about the bidders'
cost.
The assumed profit maximizing behavior made it possible to derive the equilibrium
bidding functions. These functions describe the dilemma bidders face in preparing their
bid. The bidders have to bid to maximize their profit, but the bid should be low enough to
have a reasonable chance to win the auction. The bidders have to tradeoff between the
probability of winning with the expected profit if they win the FPSBA.
B. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH




The Thesis assumed that the bidders are risk neutral. Altering this assumption
to allow bidders to be risk averse would illustrate another aspect of the bidders'
behavior in FPSBA.
2. The FPSBA practice uses several methods to influence the bidders' behavior.
Preferred measures are the reservation price and price discrimination among
the bidders. Further research would highlight the effect of these measures on
the FPSBA outcomes.
3. The FPSBA was assumed to be a static game. The bidders send signals to each
other and the buyer modifies its behavior after receiving and decoding these
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signals. Further study could analyze the FPSBA activity as a dynamic Bayesian
game and develop further understanding of these games.
C. FINAL THOUGHTS
The FPSBA is an ancient market institution which has been used for thousand of
years. The government contracting practice uses FPSBA because it furnishes an efficient
solution to the economic and resource allocation problems. The bidders' behavior in
FPSBA is determined by several factors and perceptions. Using the game theory approach
in microeconomics, this behavior can be analyzed and described. The game simulation is
one method to explore this issue. However, one should not confuse the simulation with
reality. A stochastic system model provides data which one can expect on average. These




APPENDIX A. THE BIDDING FUNCTIONS FOR N BIDDERS
This Appendix derives the general form bidding function for the uniform and
triangular cost distributions.
UNIFORM COST DISTRIBUTION
Suppose Players 1, 2, 3, ..., n adopt the strategy b(-), and assume that b(-) is
strictly increasing and differentiable. Then for a given value of Ci, player i's optimal
bidding strategy solves:
max[(bi - cO* Prob(bi < b(d) ,. . ., bj < b(c„))]
n - denotes the number of bidders.
Using the same approach as in case of three bidders, we can define the probability:
Prob(bi < b(ci+1) , . . . , bi < b(cn))= (1 - b^Cbi))"-
1
The first order condition for player i's optimization problem is therefor:
d[(bi - Ci)* (1 - b'
1 (bOr^/dbi -
(1 - b"
1 (bOr 1 + (bj - c,)*(n - 1)*(1 - b- 1(b 1))
n-2
*d(l - b^CbOVdbi =
Implying the same assumption as in case of three bidders, we substitute bi = b(Ci)
into the first order condition, yielding:
(1 - b-'OCci))"-
1




*d(l - b'^KcOydbi =
where: b
_1
(b(ci)) = q and d(l - b^KcOVdbi = - l/b'(cO
Thus, b(-) must satisfy the first order differential equation:
(1 - c,)"'
1
- (b(ci) - Ci)*(n-1)* (1 - Cir^l/bXcO =
(1 - cO"'
1
= (b(ci) - Ci)*(n-1)* (1 - Cir
2
*l/b'(ci)
We can express this equation as:
b'(Ci)*(l - c,)"-
1
- (n - 1)* b(ci) = - (n - l)*c,
The left hand side of this equation can be rewritten as:
b'(Ci)*(l - cr
1




So, the original equation can be rewritten as:
1/(1 - Ci)
n'2
* d(b(Ci)*( 1 - CirVdCi = - (n - l)*Ci
d [(b(Ci)*(l - cir
1
]/dc i = -Ci*(n - 1)*(1 - Ci)
n-2
Integrating both sides of this differential equation, the right hand side by parts
yields:
Jd [(b(cO*(l - cir










= Ci *(l - CO""
1
+ [(1 - Ci)
n
]/n + k
To determine k, we have to use the boundary conditions. That is, b(cj) >= d.
If d = 1, b(l) is finite, which is true. Thus k =
Substituting this value of k into the original equation, we find the bidding function
fori.
b(cO = ci + (1 - Ci)/n = (1 + (n -l)*Ci)/n
Under the assumption that the players' strategies are strictly increasing and
differentiate, we have a linear and symmetric Nash equilibrium in the n person bidding
game.
Applying the same method, the bidding function for the interval [0, 1] can be
derived for the cost range [h, 1]. In this case, the bidding function takes the form
b(Ci) = ((h-l) + (n-l)* Ci)/n
Where: 1 < h and
1 - the lower limit of the distribution
h - the upper limit of the distribution
COST DISTRIBUTION IS TRIANGULAR
In general, a random variable X has a triangular distribution if its probability
density function f(x) is given by
f2*(x - l)/(h - l)*(m - 1) 1< x < m
f(x) = { 2*(n - x)/(h - l)*(h - m) m < x < h
lO elsewhere
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Where: 1 < m < h and
1 - the lower limit ofthe distribution
h - the upper limit of the distribution
m- the mode of the distribution.
Height = 2/(h-l)
Figure 22 PDF of the triangular distribution
The cumulative distribution function F(x) of the triangular distribution is given by
ro
l(x-l)2/(h-l)*(m-l)
F(x) = i 1 - (h - x)
2
/ (h - l)*(h - m)
ll





max(bi - c;)* Prob{b, < b(ci+ , . .
.
, bi < b(c„)}
The number of players in the bidding game is n, so the probability that bi(c) is the
lowest bid is defined by:
ProWb, < b(c1+1 ) ,. . ., bi < b(c„)}= (1 - b-^bor
1






The triangular distribution has special characteristics. It has two different
distributions over the interval [1, h]. The dividing limit of the interval is the mode of the
distribution [m]. This Appendix will define the bidding function for bidders if their cost
falls in different intervals over [1, h].
Definition of the bidding function for cost interval [1, m]




d[(b - c)*(l - (b - l)2/(h - l)*(m - \))
n- l]/db =








*(-2*(b - 1)) =
Where: Kl = (h-l)*(m-l)
Factoring out [Kl - (b - l)2]
n"2
yields:
Kl - (b - 1)
2
-2*(n
-1) (b - c)*(b - 1) =
Kl - (b2 - 2b*l +
1
2
) - 2*(n - l)(b
2
- c*b - b*l + c*l) =
-[2*(n - 1) + l]*b
2
+ 2*[n*l + (n - l)*c]*b + Kl -
1
2
- 2*(n - l)*c*l =
-[(n - 1) + 0.5]*b
2
+ [n*l +(n - l)*c]*b +[K1 -
1
2
- 2*(n - l)*c*l]/2 =
Solving for b using the quadratic formula, we get the general formula for the
bidding function, when the cost distribution is triangular and actual costs are in the interval
[I, m]:
n*l + (n - l)*c + {(n*l + (n - l)*c)2+2*[((n - 1) + 0.5)*(K1 - l2 - 2*(n - l)*c*l)]}05
b =
2*[(n-l) + 0.5]
Using this formula, we can derive all the necessary bidding functions by
substituting in the actual parameter values.
Definition of the bidding function for cost interval [m, h]
The bidders' expected profit E(tc), has a maximum if the dE(7t)/db = 0.
E(7i) = (b-c)*[l-F(x)f 1
d{(b - c)* {1- [1 - (h - b)2/(h - l)*(h - m)] }
n
"7db =




*-2*(h - b)} =
Where: K2 = (h-l)*(h-m)





- [2*(b - c)*(n - 1) *(h - b)] =
Factoring out (h - b) yields:
h-b-2*(n-l)*(b-c) =
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Solving for b, gives the general formula for the bidding function when the cost
distribution is triangular and costs are in the interval [m, h]





APPENDIX B. DEFINITION OF EXPECTED COSTS AND BED
This appendix derives the formulas for computing the expected values of the
lowest and the second lowest costs, and the lowest bid when the bidders' production costs
have uniform distributions.
The game simulation defines the bidders' average expected profit. To validate the
simulation result and verify the simulation method, this thesis uses order statistics to
determine the expected difference between the lowest and the second lowest cost. The
difference is the winners' expected profit.
Let Xi,. . .Xn be independent identically distributed random variables with PDF f(x)
and CDF F(x). Then, the i-th order statistic Xi* has a PDF [Ref. 13:pgl51]:
f(x
;
*) = (n!/(i - l)!*(n - i)!)*(F(x))
i- 1
*(l - F(x)f'[*f(x)
Let Ci* = min(ci,...,cn) and C2* = min(c2,...,Cn) be the lowest and the
second lowest members of an order statistics < Ci* < C2* < ... < c„* < 1. The sample
was drawn from a random variable distributed uniformly over the range [0, 1].
The probability density function for the random variable is:
f(Ci) =1 if < x < 1 and f(Ci) = elsewhere.
The cumulative distribution function is:
F(x) = x if < x < 1
= if x <
= 1 if x > 1
The expected value of a random variable [Ref. 13: pg. : 42]
E(x) = Jf(x)*F(x)dx
Derivation of the expected lowest and the second lowest costs
The PDF of the lowest cost is equal to the PDF of the first order statistic, ci*:
f(ci*) = n!/(n - l)!*x°*(l - x)""
1
= n*(l - x)"" 1
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The expected value of the lowest order statistic E(ci*) is computed by:
1
E(ci*) = J x*n*(l -
n-l
Integrating the expression by parts yields:
E(c 1 *) = -x*(l-x)n = 1/n+l
1 1 1
+ J (1 - x)
ndx = - l/(n + 1)* (1 - x)
n+1 '
The PDF of the second lowest cost is equal to PDF of the order statistic C2*:
f(c2*) = n!/(n - 2)!*x*(l - x)
n'2
= n*(n - 1)* x*(l - x)n
"2





Integrating the expression by part yields:
1 1 1
E(c2*) = - x
2
*(l - xf 1 I + 2*Jx*n*(l - x)n
' 1dx= 2*J(1 - x)
ndx
1
E(c2*) = -2/n+l*(l-x)n+l = 2/n + 1
Having derived the expected values of the lowest and the second lowest order
statistics for a random sample drawn from a distribution for n bidders, we can define the
expected values of the bidders' profit in simulated cases.
In a two bidders simulation, the expected value of the lowest cost is:
E(ci*)= 1/n+l n = 2 E(ci*) = 1/3 = 0.3333
The expected value of the second lowest cost is:
E(c2*) = 2/n + 1 n = 2 E(c2*) = 2/3 = 0.6666
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In a three bidders simulation the expected value of the lowest cost is:
E(ci*) = l/n+l n = 3 E(ci*) = 1/4 = 0.25
The expected value of the second lowest cost
E(c2*) = 2/n+l n = 3 E(c2*) = 2/3 = 0.5
Definition of the lowest bid's value
To define the lowest bid's expected value, we have to derive the bids' PDF and the
CDF. The bids' distribution depends on the cost distribution from which the bidders' costs
are drawn. The correlation between the two distributions is define by the bidding function,
which takes the general form:
b = (l+(n-l)*c)/n
When the cost distribution is uniform over the range [0, 1], the bids are distributed
uniformly over the range [1/n, 1]. We can get this result by transforming the cost
distribution range and applying the bidding function.
The PDF for the bids takes the form:
f(b) = n/(n - 1) if 1/n < b < 1 and f(b) = otherwise
The CDF for the bids takes the form:
fo if b < 1/n
F(b) = i l/(n - l)*(n*x - 1) if 1/n < b < 1
ll if b> 1
To derive the lowest bid's expected value, we will need the value:
1 - F(b) = 1 - (n/n - l)*x + 1/n - 1 = n/n - l*(x - 1)
Applying the formula for the PDF of the i-th order statistics, define the PDF for
the lowest bid f(bi*) as
f(bi*) = n!/(n - l)!*(n/n - l)
nl
*(l - xf^n/n - 1 = n*(n/n - l)n* (1 - x)"" 1
if l/n<bi*<b2*<bi*...<bn*<l
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The expected value of the lowest bid, E(bi*) is
1 1 1
E(bi*) = (n/n - l)nJx*n*(l - x^dx = (n/n - l)n[-x(l - x)n] | +(n/n - l)n*J(l - c)n dx
1/n 1/n 1/n
E(bi*) = (n/n - l)n*l/n*(n -l/n)n + (n/n - l)n-(l - x)n+7n + 1
1/n
E(bi*) = 1/n + (1/n +l)*(n - l)/n = 1/n + (n - l)/n*(n + 1) = 2/n + 1
The lowest bid's expected value is given by:
E(bi*) = 2/n+l
The lowest bid's expected value is equal to the expected value of the second
lowest cost as predicted by the auctioning theory.
E(bi*) = 2/n + 1 = E(c2*) = 2/n + 1
Having derived the expected value of the lowest bid for n bidders we can define
the lowest bids' expected value in simulated cases.
In the two bidders simulation, the expected value of the lowest bid is given by:
E(ci*) = 2/n+l n = 2 E(ci*) = 2/3 = 0.6666
In the three bidders simulation, the expected value of the lowest cost is given by:
E(ci*) = 2/ n +1 n = 3 E(ci*) = 1/2 = 0.5
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APPENDIX C. COMPUTER SIMULATIONS' FINAL RESULTS
TWO-PLAYER BIDDING FOR CONTRACT GAME
1 .Uniform cost distribution
Scenario 1. Both bidders use the equilibrium strategy
Total profit Won auction Average Profit
Bidder 1 Bidder 2 Bidder 1 Bidder 2 Bidder 1 Bidder 2
50 9.43 7.46 28 22 0.337 0.339
100 19.30 13.40 56 44 0.345 0.305
250 42.61 43.02 124 126 0.344 0.341
500 83.48 86.42 248 252 0.337 0.343
750 128.26 127.24 377 373 0.340 0.341
1000 165.45 172.05 491 509 0.337 0.338
1250 209.23 213.69 620 630 0.337 0.339
1500 250.94 252.70 750 750 0.335 0.337
Table 1 Data to Figure 3
Average payoff Total payoff
Auctions Bidder 1 Bidder 2 Bidder 1 Bidder 2
50 0.189 0.1492 9.43 7.46
100 0.193 0.1340 19.30 13.40
250 0.170 0.1721 42.61 43.02
500 0.167 0.1728 83.48 86.42
750 0.171 0.1697 128.26 127.24
1000 0.165 0.1720 165.45 172.05
1250 0.167 0.1709 209.23 213.69
1500 0.167 0.1685 250.94 252.70
Table 2 Data to Figure 4
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Scenario 2. Bidder 1 used a non-equilibrium strategy while Bidder 2 use an
equilibrium strategy
Average payoff Total payoff
Auctions Bidder 1 Bidder2 Bidder
1
Bidder2
50 0.16 0.22 8.02 10.81
100 0.16 0.23 15.62 22.57
250 0.15 0.21 36.62 53.46
500 0.14 0.21 69.07 107.21
750 0.14 0.21 103.57 160.54
1000 0.14 0.21 140.13 213.96
Table 3 Data to Figure 5
Average payoff Total payoff
Auctions Bidder 1 Bidder 2 Bidder 1 Bidder 2
50 0.19 0.11 9.57 5.33
100 0.14 0.12 13.90 12.45
250 0.13 0.13 32.40 32.54
500 0.13 0.13 63.76 65.82
750 0.12 0.14 91.16 101.29
1000 0.12 0.13 122.30 133.08
Table 4 Data to Figure 6
Scenario 3. Both bidders used a non-equilibrium strategy
Average payoff Total payoff
Auctions Bidder 1 Bidder2 Bidder 1 Bidder2
50 0.123 0.090 6.15 4.52
100 0.121 0.100 12.10 10.04
250 0.112 0.107 28.08 26.85
500 0.113 0.111 56.47 55.73
750 0.107 0.115 79.95 86.25
1000 0.105 0.113 105.04 112.51
Table 5 Data to Fig. 7
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2. Triangular cost distribution
Scenario 1. Both bidders use an equilibrium strategy
Average Profit Total Payoff
Auctions Bidder 1 Bidder2 Bidder 1 Bidder2
50 0.184 0.165 9.19 8.24
100 0.193 0.177 19.29 17.70
250 0.217 0.169 54.36 42.25
500 0.202 0.196 101.14 98.24
750 0.197 0.201 147.54 150.93
1000 0.197 0.201 197.09 200.67
1500 0.198 0.194 297.26 290.61
Table 6 Data to Fig. 12
Scenario 2. Bidder 1 used a non-equilibrium strategy while Bidder 2 used
equilibrium strategy
Average Profit Total Payoff
Auctions Bidderl Bidder2 Bidderl Bidder2
50 0.270 0.232 13.50 11.61
100 0.213 0.256 21.29 25.60
250 0.172 0.267 43.00 66.70
500 0.191 0.257 95.55 128.65
750 0.190 0.258 142.15 193.39
1000 0.190 0.257 190.23 257.24
Table 7 Data to Fig 13
Average Profit Total Payoff
Auctions Bidderl Bidder2 Bidderl Bidder2
50 0.075 0.128 3.74 6.42
100 0.067 0.142 6.68 14.17
250 0.069 0.129 17.21 32.37
500 0.068 0.124 33.99 61.93
750 0.070 0.119 52.73 89.39
1000 0.071 0.121 71.38 121.36
Table 8 Data to Fig. 14
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Scenario 3. Both bidders used a non-equilibrium strategy
Average Profit Total Payoff
Auctions Bidder 1 Bidder2 Bidder 1 Bidder2
50 0.155 0.125 7.73 6.26
100 0.139 0.133 13.88 13.35
250 0.137 0.130 34.16 32.49
500 0.125 0.134 62.68 66.80
750 0.129 0.138 96.66 103.37
1000 0.131 0.136 131.39 136.14
1500 0.125 0.137 188.19 206.12
Table 9 Data to Fig 15
THREE PLAYER BIDDING FOR CONTRACT GAMES
1 . Uniform cost distribution
Scenario 1. All bidders used an equilibrium strategy
Average profit Won Auctions Total Profit
Auctions Bidder 1 Bidder 2 Bidder 3 Bidder 1 Bidder 2 Bidder 3 Bidder 1 Bidder 2 Bidder 3
50 0.24 0.25 0.26 13 19 18 3.15 4.69 4.60
150 0.24 0.25 0.25 53 50 47 12.90 12.52 11.80
250 0.25 0.25 0.25 83 72 95 20.59 18.29 23.57
500 0.25 0.26 0.25 168 159 173 41.60 40.85 43.49
1000 0.25 0.25 0.25 358 323 319 88.80 81.21 79.76
1500 0.25 0.25 0.25 536 486 478 132.99 122.08 119.31
2000 0.25 0.25 0.25 692 663 645 172.43 166.34 161.45
2500 0.25 0.25 0.25 876 821 803 219.59 206.58 200.70
Table 10 Data to Fig. 8
Average Profit Total Profit
Auctions Bidder 1 Bidder 2 Bidder 3 Bidder 1 Bidder 2 Bidder 3
50 0.063 0.094 0.092 3.15 4.69 4.60
150 0.086 0.083 0.079 12.90 12.52 11.80
250 0.082 0.073 0.094 20.59 18.29 23.57
500 0.083 0.082 0.087 41.60 40.85 43.49
1000 0.089 0.081 0.080 88.80 81.21 79.76
1500 0.089 0.081 0.080 132.99 122.08 119.31
2000 0.086 0.083 0.081 172.43 166.34 161.45
2500 0.088 0.083 0.080 219.59 206.58 200.70
Table 1 1 Data to Fig. 9
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Scenario 2. Bidder 3 uses a non-equilibrium strategy while Bidder 1 and 2 use
an equilibrium strategy:
Average profit Total profit
Auctions Bidder 1 Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidderl Bidder2 Bidder3
100 0.097 0.111 0.047 9.70 11.05 4.66
250 0.109 0.104 0.042 27.30 25.88 10.39
500 0.111 0.105 0.040 55.54 52.28 20.19
750 0.110 0.101 0.047 82.64 76.06 35.54
1000 0.112 0.100 0.044 111.83 100.41 44.45
1500 0.108 0.105 0.048 161.53 157.24 71.64
Table 12 Data to Fig. 10
Average profit Total profit
Auctions Bidder 1 Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidderl Bidder2 Bidder3
100 0.060 0.062 0.051 5.99 6.22 5.07
250 0.062 0.065 0.043 15.55 16.31 10.82
500 0.062 0.071 0.041 31.10 35.43 20.49
750 0.062 0.071 0.041 46.21 53.31 30.65
1000 0.061 0.068 0.041 61.06 68.03 41.17
1500 0.062 0.064 0.042 92.73 96.03 62.52
Table 13 Data to Fig. 11
Scenario 3. All bidders use a non-equilibrium strategy:
Average profit Total profit
Auctions Bidderl Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidderl Bidder2 Bidder3
100 0.052 0.087 0.061 5.17 8.73 6.10
250 0.066 0.065 0.068 16.51 16.35 16.89
500 0.066 0.069 0.068 33.13 34.35 34.17
750 0.066 0.071 0.063 49.26 53.15 47.29
1000 0.066 0.070 0.065 65.52 69.90 64.72
1500 0.067 0.068 0.066 100.00 101.70 99.62
Table 14 Data to Fig. 12
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2. Triangular cost distribution
Scenario 1. All bidders use an equilibrium strategy
Average profit Total profit
Auctions Bidderl Bidder2 Bidder3 Bidderl Bidder2 Bidder3
50 0.121 0.141 0.243 6.06 7.05 12.16
100 0.151 0.147 0.170 15.07 14.73 16.97
250 0.151 0.155 0.148 37.65 38.81 37.00
500 0.165 0.145 0.151 82.63 72.45 75.36
750 0.162 0.145 0.162 121.52 108.75 121.39
1000 0.161 0.152 0.159 160.55 151.95 158.52
1500 0.160 0.154 0.156 240.13 231.55 233.68
Table 15 Data to Fig. 17
Scenario 2. Bidder 3 uses a non-equilibrium strategy while Bidder 1 and 2 use
an equilibrium strategy
Average profit Total profit
Auctions Bidder 1 Bidder 2 Bidder 3 Bidder 1 Bidder 2 Bidder 3
50 0.164 0.189 0.106 8.19 9.43 5.32
100 0.179 0.175 0.132 17.91 17.45 13.19
250 0.158 0.185 0.164 39.55 46.20 40.93
500 0.171 0.182 0.146 85.29 91.00 72.84
750 0.156 0.195 0.148 116.81 146.62 110.95
1000 0.162 0.191 0.154 161.78 190.51 154.22
1500 0.173 0.177 0.153 258.78 266.07 228.94
Table 16 Data to Fig. 18
Average profit Total profit
Auctions Bidder 1 Bidder 2 Bidder 3 Bidder 1 Bidder 2 Bidder 3
50 0.134 0.130 0.111 6.68 6.50 5.53
100 0.129 0.141 0.119 12.85 14.06 11.95
250 0.143 0.109 0.119 35.75 27.26 29.63
500 0.153 0.120 0.116 76.44 59.88 57.76
750 0.149 0.128 0.117 111.68 95.85 87.77
1000 0.147 0.137 0.117 146.70 136.79 117.04
1500 0.141 0.142 0.117 211.02 213.15 175.08
Table 17 Data to Fig. 19
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Scenario 3. All bidders use a non-equilibrium strategy
Average profit Total profit
Auctions Bidder 1 Bidder 2 Bidder 3 Bidder 1 Bidder 2 Bidder 3
50 0.080 0.102 0.159 8.00 10.21 15.93
100 0.101 0.142 0.129 20.24 28.32 25.78
150 0.105 0.147 0.140 31.48 44.13 42.02
250 0.122 0.145 0.136 61.057 72.312 68.089
500 0.127 0.128 0.140 126.92 128.07 140.05
750 0.129 0.125 0.140 193.54 187.68 209.26
1000 0.130 0.127 0.137 259.96 254.38 273.77
1500 0.128 0.131 0.133 384.00 393.99 398.52
Table 18 Data to Fig. 20
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APPENDIX D. VISUAL BASIC PROGRAMS FOR SIMULATIONS
1 . Simulation program with uniform cost distribution
" simul2 Macro simulation of three bidders auction
' Macro recorded 4/9/97 by Andras I. Kucsma
" The program has been prepared for n bidders. However,
1
to extend it for more than three bidders the program
1
needs some adjustment. It has to be added
'
- new subroutines of cost and bid calculation;
'
- the selection of the winner must be corrected too.
Sub simul2()
Application. ScreenUpdating = False
Definition of the variables
Dim 1, h, n, Num, Costl, Cost2, Cost3 As Variant
Dim Bidl, Bid2, Bid3, Payoffl, Payoffi, PayofB As Variant
Dim Randl, Rand2, Rand3 As Variant
Giving initial values to variables











Start loop enter the required number of loops after "To"
For Num = 1 To 500
Randomize 'sets the seed number of random number generation to a new value
' Cost generation




Cost2 = Rnd * (h - 1) + 1
Range("b3").Select
ActiveCell.Value = Cost2
Cost3 = Rnd * (h - 1) + 1
Range("c3"). Select
ActiveCell.Value = Cost3
' Computation of bids
Bidl = ((h - 1) + (n - 1) * Costl) In
Range("d3"). Select
ActiveCell.Value = Bidl
Bid2 = ((h - 1)+ (n - 1) * Cost2) / n
Range("e3 M).Select
ActiveCell.Value = Bid2
Bid3 = ((h - 1) + (n - 1) * Cost3) / n
Range("f3"). Select
ActiveCell.Value = Bid3
1 Selecting the winning bid







IfBid2 < Bidl And Bid2 < Bid3 Then GoTo Row3: Else GoTo Row4:
Row3:






IfBid3 < Bidl And Bid3 < Bid2 Then GoTo Row5:
Row5:

















For I = 1 To 3 ' Loop 3 times.
Beep ' Sound a tone.
Next
End Sub
2. Simulation program with triangular cost distribution
1
simul2 Macro simulation of two bidders auction
' Distribution is triangular
1 Macro recorded 4/9/97 by Andras I. Kucsma
1 The program has been prepared for n bidders. However,
1
to extend it for more than two bidders the program
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1needs some adjustment. It has to be added
'
- new subroutines of cost and bid calculation;
'
- the selection of the winner must be corrected too.
i
Sub simul2()
Application. ScreenUpdating = False
Dim h, m, 1, n, Num, Randl, Rand2, Costl, Cost2 As Variant
Dim Bidl, Bid la, Bid lb, Bidlc, Bid2, Bid2a, bid2b As Variant
Dim Payoffl, Payoff2 As Variant
1 Giving initial values to variables
Sheets("Sheetl"). Select
1 = 0' lower limit of cost range
Range("bl"). Select
ActiveCell.Value = 1
m = 1 ' mode of the cost distribution
Range("dl").Select
ActiveCell.Value = m






n = 2 ' number of bidder
' Start loop enter the number of required after "To"
Num =
For Num = 1 To 250
'Computation of costs
Randomize ' sets the seed number of the random number generator
' Computation of Costl
Randl =Rnd()
IfRandl < ((m - 1) / (h - 1)) Then
Costl = ((Randl * (h - 1) * (m - 1)) A 0.5) + 1
Else
90
Costl = h - ((1 - Randl) * (h - 1) * (h - m)) A 0.5
End If




' Computation of Cost2
Rand2 = Rnd()
IfRand2 < ((m - 1) / (h - 1)) Then
Cost2 = ((Rand2 * (h - 1) * (m - 1)) A 0.5) + 1
Else
Cost2 = h - ((1 - Rand2) * (h - 1) * (h - m)) A 0.5
End If




1 Computation of bids
Bidla = (n-l) + 0.5
If Costl <mThen
Bidlb = n*l + (n- 1) * Costl
Bidlc = Bidla * (h - 1) * (m - 1) - (1 A 2) - (2 * Costl * (n - 1) * 1)
Bidl = (Bid lb + (Bidlb A 2 + 2 * Bidlc) A 0.5) / (2 * Bidla)
Else
Bidl = (h + (2 * (n - 1) * Costl)) / (2 * Bidla)
End If
'bidl to Sheet 1






bid2b = n*l + (n-l)*Cost2
Bid2c = Bidla * (h - 1) * (m - 1) - (1 A 2) - (2 * Cost2 * (n - 1) * 1)
Bid2 = (bid2b + (bid2b A 2 + 2 * Bid2c) A 0.5) / (2 * Bidla)
Else
Bid2 = (h + (2 * (n - 1) * Cost2)) / (2 * Bidla)
End If
'Bid2 to Sheet 1
Sheets(" Sheet 1"). Select
Range("d3"). Select
ActiveCell.Value = Bid2
'Defining the winner and its Payoff
IfBid 1 < Bid2 Then GoTo Rowl : Else GoTo Row2:
Rowl:






Payoff2 = Bid2 - Cost2




1 Collecting result of the auction in new row
Range("A4"). Select
Selection.EntireRow. Insert











For I = 1 To 3 ' Loop 3 times.





APPENDIX E. STATISTICAL ANALYSES OF COST DISTRIBUTION
This thesis used the Excel 5.0 software data analyzer package to inspect the
distribution of random variables used in the simulations. Selected data series were
analyzed using histograms and cumulative probabilities. The results of the analyses are
presented in this Appendix.
Analysis of costs used in simulations with uniform distributions
Histogram of Bidder l's cost distribution
used in equilibrium bidding simulation
Frequency
Cumulative %
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Figure 1 Histogram of uniform distribution
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Histogram of Bidder 2's cost distribution






Figure 2 Histogram iDf uniform distribution
Data of the cost distribution histograms for uniform distribution
Bidder l'scost Bidder 2's cost
Bin Frequency Cumulative % Bin Frequency Cumulative %
0.001 1 0.0% 0.000 1 .0%
0.021 55 2.2% 0.020 53 2.2%
0.041 69 5.0% 0.040 46 4.0%
0.061 45 6.8% 0.060 49 6.0%
0.081 58 9.1% 0.080 57 8.2%
0.101 51 11.2% 0.100 64 10.8%
0.121 50 13.2% 0.120 55 13.0%
0.141 54 15.3% 0.140 60 15.4%
0.161 47 17.2% 0.160 42 17.1%
0.181 51 19.2% 0.180 56 19.3%
0.201 47 21.1% 0.200 51 21.4%
0.221 63 23.6% 0.220 39 22.9%
0.241 45 25.4% 0.240 51 25.0%
0.261 43 27.2% 0.260 49 26.9%
0.281 57 29.4% 0.280 44 28.7%
0.301 40 31.0% 0.300 39 30.2%
0.321 43 32.8% 0.320 39 31.8%
0.341 43 34.5% 0.340 57 34.1%
0.361 55 36.7% 0.360 46 35.9%
0.381 47 38.6% 0.380 48 37.8%
0.401 46 40.4% 0.400 53 40.0%
0.421 44 42.2% 0.420 53 42.1%
0.441 45 44.0% 0.440 47 44.0%
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Bin Frequency Cumulative % Bin Frequency Cumulative %
0.461 50 46.0% 0.460 46 45.8%
0.480 58 48.3% 0.480 42 47.5%
0.500 46 50.1% 0.500 68 50.2%
0.520 57 52.4% 0.520 44 52.0%
0.540 38 53.9% 0.540 38 53.5%
0.560 44 55.7% 0.560 63 56.0%
0.580 40 57.3% 0.580 57 58.3%
0.600 64 59.8% 0.600 53 60.4%
0.620 61 62.3% 0.620 56 62.6%
0.640 55 64.5% 0.640 49 64.6%
0.660 46 66.3% 0.660 51 66.6%
0.680 64 68.9% 0.680 52 68.7%
0.700 41 70.5% 0.700 40 70.3%
0.720 54 72.7% 0.720 47 72.2%
0.740 61 75.1% 0.740 52 74.3%
0.760 55 77.3% 0.760 45 76.1%
0.780 55 79.5% 0.780 45 77.9%
0.800 47 81.4% 0.800 57 80.2%
0.820 50 83.4% 0.820 47 82.0%
0.840 41 85.0% 0.840 43 83.8%
0.860 52 87.1% 0.860 58 86.1%
0.880 36 88.6% 0.880 49 88.0%
0.900 47 90.4% 0.900 53 90.2%
0.920 52 92.5% 0.920 44 91.9%
0.940 49 94.5% 0.940 48 93.8%
0.960 48 96.4% 0.960 54 96.0%
0.980 52 98.5% 0.980 50 98.0%
More 38 100.0% More 50 100.0%
Table 19 Data to uniform distribution histogram
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Analysis of cost used in simulations with triangular distributions
Histogram Bidder l's cost distribution
used in equilibrium bidding simulation
Bin
Figure 4 Histogram of triangular distribution
Histogram of Bidder 2's cost distribution
used in equilibrium bidding simulation
Bin
Figure 4 Histogram of triangular distribution
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Figures three and four shows that the costs used in the equilibrium game
simulation follow the required triangular pattern of distribution. The cumulative
percentage represents the cumulative probability distribution of the sample data.
Cost distribution histogram data for triangular distribution
Bidder l's cost Bidder 2's cost
Bin Frequency Cumulative % Bin Frequency Cumulative %
0.037 1 .1% 0.035 1 .1%
0.088 4 .3% 0.086 3 .3%
0.139 11 1.1% 0.137 7 .7%
0.190 6 1.5% 0.188 13 1.6%
0.241 8 2.0% 0.239 18 2.8%
0.293 19 3.3% 0.291 20 4.1%
0.344 23 4.8% 0.342 33 6.3%
0.395 29 6.7% 0.393 32 8.5%
0.446 38 9.3% 0.444 44 11.4%
0.497 47 12.4% 0.495 27 13.2%
0.548 39 15.0% 0.546 43 16.1%
0.599 55 18.7% 0.597 42 18.9%
0.650 54 22.3% 0.649 39 21.5%
0.701 53 25.8% 0.700 59 25.4%
0.752 51 29.2% 0.751 56 29.1%
0.803 64 33.5% 0.802 54 32.7%
0.854 73 38.3% 0.853 58 36.6%
0.905 68 42.9% 0.904 69 41.2%
0.956 59 46.8% 0.955 68 45.7%
1.007 74 51.7% 1.007 72 50.5%
1.058 80 57.1% 1.058 76 55.6%
1.109 67 61.5% 1.109 60 59.6%
1.160 70 66.2% 1.160 58 63.5%
1.211 56 69.9% 1.211 79 68.7%
1.262 53 73.5% 1.262 67 73.2%
1.313 49 76.7% 1.313 62 77.3%
1.364 50 80.1% 1.365 52 80.8%
1.415 46 83.1% 1.416 40 83.5%
1.466 43 86.0% 1.467 39 86.1%
1.517 41 88.7% 1.518 32 88.2%
1.568 29 90.7% 1.569 37 90.7%
1.619 33 92.9% 1.620 40 93.3%
1.670 22 94.3% 1.671 37 95.8%
1.721 28 96.2% 1.723 12 96.6%
1.772 16 97.3% 1.774 11 97.3%
1.824 13 98. 1% 1.825 15 98.3%
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Cost distribution histogram data for triangular distribution
Bidder l's cost Bidder 2's cost
Bin Frequency Cumulative % Bin Frequency Cumulative %
1.875 15 99.1% 1.876 18 99.5%
1.926 9 99.7% 1.927 4 99.8%
More 4 100.0% More 3 100.0%
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APPENDIX F. EXTRACTS FROM THE SIMULATIONS' DATA
This Appendix provides samples from the simulations' data for the first one
hundred simulated auctions. The volume of data generated by the simulations precludes
presenting the full data series.
1. Two-bidder uniform cost distribution
Scenario 1
# Costl Cost2 Bidl Bid2 Payoffl Payoffi
100 0.366 0.842 0.683 0.921 0.3171
99 0.84 0.375 0.92 0.688 0.3124
98 0.194 0.629 0.597 0.814 0.4029
97 0.303 0.283 0.652 0.642 0.3584
96 0.817 0.583 0.909 0.792 0.2084
95 0.342 0.811 0.671 0.906 0.3289
94 0.216 0.948 0.608 0.974 0.3919
93 0.665 0.633 0.833 0.817 0.1835
92 0.728 0.633 0.864 0.816 0.1836
91 0.334 0.373 0.667 0.687 0.3331
90 0.055 0.424 0.528 0.712 0.4724
89 0.555 0.805 0.777 0.902 0.2225
88 0.177 0.383 0.588 0.691 0.4117
87 0.102 0.216 0.551 0.608 0.4492
86 0.559 0.843 0.78 0.921 0.2203
85 0.956 0.85 0.978 0.925 0.0748
84 0.917 0.46 0.959 0.73 0.2702
83 0.624 0.591 0.812 0.795 0.2046
82 0.979 0.844 0.989 0.922 0.0778
81 0.314 0.209 0.657 0.605 0.3954
80 0.327 0.514 0.663 0.757 0.3367
79 0.517 0.245 0.759 0.623 0.3773
78 0.188 0.601 0.594 0.8 0.406
77 0.637 0.286 0.818 0.643 0.3569
76 0.966 0.692 0.983 0.846 0.1539
75 0.322 0.931 0.661 0.965 0.339
74 0.293 0.483 0.646 0.742 0.3537
73 0.792 0.864 0.896 0.932 0.1039
72 0.437 0.372 0.719 0.686 0.3142
71 0.097 0.799 0.548 0.899 0.4516
70 0.086 0.238 0.543 0.619 0.4571
69 0.878 0.791 0.939 0.895 0.1046
68 0.84 0.4 0.92 0.7 0.2999
67 0.301 0.02 0.65 0.51 0.4899
66 0.419 0.685 0.71 0.842 0.2904
65 0.302 0.766 0.651 0.883 0.3488
64 0.315 0.071 0.657 0.535 0.4646
63 0.105 0.706 0.553 0.853 0.4473
62 0.275 0.065 0.637 0.533 0.4674
61 0.458 0.344 0.729 0.672 0.3279
60 0.966 0.602 0.983 0.801 0.1992
59 0.808 0.931 0.904 0.966 0.096
58 0.296 0.384 0.648 0.692 0.3518
57 0.796 0.765 0.898 0.882 0.1177
56 0.176 0.866 0.588 0.933 0.4121
55 0.019 0.178 0.51 0.589 0.4904
54 0.323 0.737 0.661 0.868 0.3387
53 0.374 0.808 0.687 0.904 0.3128
52 0.336 0.418 0.668 0.709 0.332
51 0.099 0.149 0.549 0.574 0.4507
50 0.141 0.275 0.571 0.637 0.4294
49 0.772 0.863 0.886 0.931 0.1139
48 0.785 0.167 0.892 0.584 0.4163
47 0.575 0.802 0.788 0.901 0.2124
46 0.511 0.564 0.756 0.782 0.2443
45 0.462 0.245 0.731 0.622 0.3776
44 0.21 0.126 0.605 0.563 0.4372
43 0.052 0.455 0.526 0.728 0.474
42 0.039 0.912 0.519 0.956 0.4805
41 0.515 0.363 0.758 0.682 0.3183
40 0.662 0.867 0.831 0.933 0.1691
39 0.82 0.298 0.91 0.649 0.351
38 0.123 0.857 0.562 0.928 0.4384
37 0.674 0.932 0.837 0.966 0.1632
36 0.134 0.546 0.567 0.773 0.4331
35 0.342 0.673 0.671 0.836 0.3288
34 0.165 0.114 0.583 0.557 0.4431
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33 0.783 0.789 0.892 0.895 0.1084
32 0.56 0.504 0.78 0.752 0.2479
31 0.327 0.209 0.663 0.605 0.3954
30 0.997 0.565 0.999 0.782 0.2177
29 0.181 0.844 0.59 0.922 0.4096
28 0.932 0.716 0.966 0.858 0.1422
27 0.538 0.456 0.769 0.728 0.2719
26 0.525 0.913 0.762 0.957 0.2375
25 0.025 0.294 0.512 0.647 0.4877
24 0.404 0.395 0.702 0.698 0.3025
23 0.064 0.822 0.532 0.911 0.4682
22 0.318 0.668 0.659 0.834 0.341
21 0.111 0.221 0.555 0.61 0.4446
20 0.807 0.424 0.903 0.712 0.2882
19 0.281 0.957 0.641 0.978 0.3595
18 0.402 0.612 0.701 0.806 0.2989
17 0.269 0.79 0.635 0.895 0.3654
16 0.547 0.501 0.774 0.75 0.2497
15 0.492 0.204 0.746 0.602 0.3982
14 0.241 0.089 0.621 0.544 0.4557
13 0.425 0.368 0.712 0.684 0.3162
12 0.418 0.716 0.709 0.858 0.2908
11 0.26 0.046 0.63 0.523 0.4769
10 0.277 0.32 0.638 0.66 0.3617
9 0.776 0.701 0.888 0.85 0.1495
8 0.422 0.209 0.711 0.604 0.3957
7 0.314 0.234 0.657 0.617 0.3831
6 0.04 0.258 0.52 0.629 0.48
5 0.62 0.151 0.81 0.576 0.4244
4 0.316 0.354 0.658 0.677 0.3419
3 0.791 0.887 0.895 0.944 0.1047
2 0.309 0.649 0.654 0.824 0.3456
1 0.008 0.845 0.504 0.922 0.496
Win Win I I
Prof 1 Prof 2
0.386 0.268 19.298 13.401
2. Three-bidder uniform cost distribution
Scenario 1
high 1 low 3 Bidders Equilibrium
Costl Cost2 Cost3 Bidl Bid2 Bid3 Payoffl PayofiE PayofiB
1
0.844 0.216 0.36 0.896 0.477 0.573 0.2613
0.961 0.953 0.575 0.974 0.968 0.717 0.1417
0.262 0.839 0.486 0.508 0.893 0.657 0.246
0.213 0.074 0.708 0.475 0.383 0.805 0.3086
0.583 0.044 0.997 0.722 0.363 0.998 0.3187
0.769 0.365 0.084 0.846 0.576 0.389 0.3055
0.381 0.347 0.617 0.588 0.564 0.745 0.2178
0.503 0.556 0.453 0.669 0.704 0.636 0.1822
0.219 0.447 0.101 0.48 0.631 0.4 0.2998
0.694 0.037 0.972 0.796 0.358 0.981 0.3211
0.954 0.172 0.769 0.969 0.448 0.846 0.2762
0.856 0.698 0.676 0.904 0.799 0.784 0.1079
0.059 0.665 0.48 0.373 0.777 0.654 0.314
0.592 0.874 0.118 0.728 0.916 0.412 0.294
0.44 0.476 0.815 0.627 0.65 0.877 0.187
0.779 0.383 0.508 0.853 0.589 0.672 0.2056
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0.47 0.426 0.469 0.647 0.617 0.646 0.1913
0.677 0.623 0.112 0.785 0.749 0.408 0.2958
0.927 0.814 0.652 0.951 0.876 0.768 0.1161
0.889 0.979 0.188 0.926 0.986 0.459 0.2707
0.864 0.318 0.821 0.909 0.545 0.881 0.2274
0.36 0.784 0.249 0.573 0.856 0.5 0.2502
0.171 0.573 0.155 0.447 0.715 0.437 0.2817
0.101 0.932 0.82 0.401 0.954 0.88 0.3
0.642 0.876 0.724 0.761 0.917 0.816 0.119
0.066 0.771 0.224 0.377 0.847 0.483 0.311
0.353 0.74 0.764 0.569 0.827 0.842 0.216
0.454 0.074 0.043 0.636 0.382 0.362 0.3191
0.216 0.688 0.932 0.478 0.792 0.955 0.261
0.444 0.76 0.133 0.629 0.84 0.422 0.2891
0.964 0.295 0.181 0.976 0.53 0.454 0.273
0.377 0.759 0.874 0.585 0.839 0.916 0.208
0.627 0.449 0.921 0.751 0.633 0.947 0.1837
0.517 0.544 0.022 0.678 0.696 0.348 0.3261
0.044 0.072 0.047 0.363 0.382 0.365 0.319
0.487 0.355 0.555 0.658 0.57 0.703 0.215
0.224 0.121 0.759 0.483 0.414 0.839 0.2928
0.466 0.111 0.33 0.644 0.408 0.553 0.2962
0.3 0.796 0.656 0.533 0.864 0.77 0.233
0.902 0.088 0.672 0.935 0.392 0.781 0.304
0.674 0.648 0.804 0.783 0.765 0.87 0.1174
0.906 0.692 0.133 0.938 0.795 0.422 0.2889
0.657 0.875 0.216 0.772 0.916 0.477 0.2613
0.317 0.855 0.581 0.545 0.904 0.721 0.228
0.904 0.523 0.727 0.936 0.682 0.818 0.1589
0.675 0.339 0.585 0.783 0.559 0.723 0.2203
0.156 0.144 0.367 0.437 0.429 0.578 0.2854
0.377 0.757 0.89 0.584 0.838 0.926 0.208
0.174 0.129 0.916 0.449 0.42 0.944 0.2902
0.623 0.872 0.102 0.749 0.914 0.401 0.2993
0.915 0.745 0.985 0.943 0.83 0.99 0.0849
0.125 0.653 0.591 0.416 0.769 0.728 0.292
0.389 0.97 0.493 0.593 0.98 0.662 0.204
0.487 0.575 0.426 0.658 0.717 0.617 0.1915
0.287 0.21 0.098 0.525 0.473 0.398 0.3008
0.272 0.995 0.465 0.514 0.997 0.644 0.243
0.64 0.722 0.973 0.76 0.814 0.982 0.12
0.96 0.996 0.891 0.973 0.997 0.928 0.0362
0.049 0.9 0.348 0.366 0.934 0.566 0.317
0.403 0.467 0.703 0.602 0.645 0.802 0.199
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1 0.79 0.048 0.919 0.86 0.366 0.946 0.3172
0.003 0.961 0.966 0.335 0.974 0.977 0.332
0.365 0.23 0.78 0.577 0.487 0.853 0.2567
0.104 0.482 0.548 0.403 0.655 0.699 0.299
0.143 0.19 0.142 0.428 0.46 0.428 0.286
0.453 0.521 0.803 0.635 0.681 0.868 0.182
0.212 0.407 0.346 0.475 0.604 0.564 0.263
0.196 0.19 0.729 0.464 0.46 0.819 0.2701
0.457 0.094 0.147 0.638 0.396 0.431 0.3021
0.785 0.314 0.307 0.857 0.543 0.538 0.2309
0.348 0.377 0.55 0.565 0.585 0.7 0.217
0.531 0.969 0.29 0.687 0.979 0.527 0.2366
0.911 0.626 0.112 0.941 0.751 0.408 0.2959
0.461 0.516 0.259 0.641 0.677 0.506 0.2471
0.483 0.821 0.916 0.656 0.881 0.944 0.172
0.916 0.883 0.593 0.944 0.922 0.729 0.1356
0.608 0.67 0.829 0.739 0.78 0.886 0.131
0.504 0.481 0.333 0.67 0.654 0.555 0.2223
0.799 0.15 0.348 0.866 0.434 0.565 0.2832
0.363 0.456 0.373 0.575 0.638 0.582 0.212
0.961 0.812 0.052 0.974 0.874 0.368 0.316
0.61 0.105 0.884 0.74 0.403 0.923 0.2983
0.177 0.14 0.256 0.452 0.427 0.504 0.2867
0.319 0.948 0.076 0.546 0.965 0.384 0.3079
0.228 0.433 0.169 0.485 0.622 0.446 0.277
0.207 0.743 0.931 0.472 0.829 0.954 0.264
0.126 0.673 0.774 0.417 0.782 0.849 0.291
0.399 0.725 0.942 0.599 0.816 0.961 0.2
0.666 0.061 0.707 0.777 0.374 0.804 0.313
0.68 0.164 0.396 0.787 0.443 0.598 0.2785
0.34 0.646 0.254 0.56 0.764 0.502 0.2488
0.722 0.013 0.559 0.814 0.342 0.706 0.329
0.956 0.543 0.452 0.971 0.695 0.635 0.1825
0.802 0.659 0.585 0.868 0.772 0.723 0.1384
0.921 0.382 0.857 0.948 0.588 0.904 0.2059
0.169 0.587 0.339 0.446 0.724 0.559 0.277
0.84 0.498 0.018 0.894 0.665 0.345 0.3273
0.173 0.69 0.308 0.449 0.793 0.538 0.276
0.831 0.185 0.108 0.887 0.456 0.405 0.2973
0.921 0.297 0.556 0.947 0.531 0.704 0.2343
B 1 B2 B3 Tpr.l Tpr2 Tpr3
Average Prof 0.076 0.082 0.089 7.64 8.152 8.8805 100
Winning Prof 0.239 0.255 0.247 32 32 36
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